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TWO FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HEALTH 
INSURANCE PROGRAMS ARE ONE TOO 
MANY: RECONSIDERING THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-
PROVIDED HEALTH INSURANCE IN LIGHT 
OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Abstract: Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) provides a 
federal income tax exclusion for the value of employer-provided health 
insurance. This decades-old provision was enacted for the primary pur-
pose of increasing the incidence of health insurance in the United States. 
Since its adoption, scholars have advanced a number of additional policy 
considerations in support of preserving this exclusion. The enactment of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), however, will re-
sult in a significant overhaul of the American health care system. As a re-
sult, a reexamination of I.R.C. § 106 is warranted. This Note argues that 
the ACA has rendered each of the policy considerations in support of 
I.R.C. § 106 largely irrelevant, inapplicable, or generally less compelling— 
whereas the arguments in favor of repeal now seem all the more convinc-
ing. Nevertheless, policymakers should stop short of outright repeal be-
cause of a number of drawbacks that may prove unavoidable. Conse-
quently, this Note proposes a middle ground that instead calls for 
significant reform. Converting the exclusion into a progressive, refund-
able tax credit would largely accomplish the goals sought by repeal, while 
still avoiding the negative repercussions that total repeal may engender. 
Introduction 
 Section 106 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) creates a gov-
ernment subsidy for employer-provided health insurance that covers 
millions of Americans.1 Pursuant to this rule, employees are not taxed 
on the health care benefits that they receive from their employers.2 
                                                                                                                      
1 See I.R.C. § 106 (2006); Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, P60-
235, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007, 
at 20 (2008); see also Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 112th Cong., JCS-1-12, Esti-
mates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2011–2015, at 42 (Comm. Print 
2012) [hereinafter Joint Comm. on Taxation 2012] (calculating the subsidy across a 
number of years). 
2 See I.R.C. § 106(a). 
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This pervasive, politically popular provision is designed to promote so-
cial justice by increasing the number of individuals who are insured.3 In 
addition, I.R.C. § 106 is also considered to be the best available risk-
pooling device and an effective constraint on health care costs.4 
 Despite these apparent benefits, the time has come to reconsider 
the propriety of preserving I.R.C. § 106 in our tax code.5 The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has dramatically altered the 
landscape in which the prior policy considerations for maintaining 
I.R.C. § 106 were couched.6 For example, the ACA implements a vari-
ety of measures that are designed to both curb the costs of health care 
and ensure universal insurance coverage.7 As a result, it may now be 
the case that the ACA has effectively usurped the role of I.R.C. § 106, 
rendering the tax exemption unnecessary.8 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Diane Lim Rogers, Tax Expenditures: More Entitlements Than Loopholes, Tax Notes, 
Nov. 14, 2011, at 897, 899 (discussing how the provision is politically popular); J. Paul Sin-
gleton, Can You Really Have Too Much of a Good Thing?: How Benevolent Tax Policies Have At-
tributed to the Explosion of Health Care Costs and How New Policies Threaten to Do More of the 
Same, 8 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 305, 310–12 (2010) (discussing how the provision pro-
motes social justice); Martin A. Sullivan, The Hypocrisy of Tax Reform, Tax Notes, Oct. 8, 
2012, at 119, 119 (discussing how the provision is politically popular). This provision cov-
ers nearly 60% of all insured Americans. DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 1, at 20. Cov-
ered taxpayers directly benefit from I.R.C. § 106 because this provision reduces their total 
taxable income by the value of their employer-provided coverage. See I.R.C. § 106(a). In 
addition, their employers receive an indirect benefit from I.R.C. § 106 because they are 
able to provide their employees with the same amount of benefits at a lower cost. See Linda 
Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 Colum. J. Tax L. 1, 21 (2011). 
4 See Bob Lyke, Cong. Research Serv., RL34767, The Tax Exclusion for Em-
ployer-Provided Health Insurance: Policy Issues Regarding the Repeal Debate 11, 
18 (2008) (risk pooling); Edward A. Zelinsky, Reforming Health Care: The Paradoxes of Cost, 
31 J. Legal Med. 203, 204, 211, 213 (2010) (constraining costs). Risk pooling refers to the 
ability to combine both healthy and sick individuals into a single group for insurance pur-
poses, which results in more reasonable, shared costs for all. See David Gamage, Perverse 
Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to 
Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 Tax L. Rev. 669, 677–81 
(2012). 
5 See Michael Joe, Rollback Possible for Employer-Provided Healthcare Exclusion, Analysts Say, 
Tax Notes, June 21, 2010, at 1322, 1322. 
6 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Joe, supra note 5, at 1322. 
7 See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate About the Afford-
able Care Act, 80 UMKC L. Rev. 45, 52 (2011) (universal coverage); Patrick J. Miller, Health 
Reform Is Not Just Insurance Reform: Significant Changes in Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, Advo-
cate, Oct. 2010, at 28, 28 (curb costs); see also infra notes 118–147 and accompanying text 
(discussing how specific provisions of the ACA combine to achieve these goals). 
8 See infra notes 243–310 and accompanying text (illustrating how, in light of the ACA, 
arguments in favor of repealing I.R.C. § 106 have become increasingly compelling, 
whereas the policy considerations for preserving I.R.C. § 106 are no longer applicable). 
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 This Note argues that, given the implementation of the ACA, the 
justifications for repealing I.R.C. § 106 outweigh those for keeping it.9 
The ACA neatly accomplishes the goals of I.R.C. § 106 and therefore 
largely undermines the policy considerations that support I.R.C. § 106.10 
As a result, the arguments for repealing I.R.C. § 106 have become in-
creasingly compelling.11 Nevertheless, this Note argues that although 
I.R.C. § 106 should undergo significant reforms, policymakers should 
stop short of outright repeal.12 For example, full repeal of I.R.C. § 106 
risks depriving certain taxpayers—who may fall through the cracks un-
der an exclusive ACA regime—of any meaningful assistance.13 Instead, 
converting I.R.C. § 106 into a progressive, refundable tax credit would 
accomplish the goals sought by complete repeal, while avoiding the po-
tential pitfalls.14 
 Part I of this Note introduces I.R.C. § 106 and outlines some of its 
traditional policy underpinnings.15 Part II then begins by illustrating 
how the ACA has changed the health care landscape, thus necessitating 
a reexamination of I.R.C. § 106.16 It then outlines the policy justifica-
tions in favor of repeal of I.R.C. § 106, particularly in light of the 
ACA.17 Finally, Part III discusses how the ACA has largely usurped the 
role of I.R.C. § 106, thereby rendering the policy considerations in 
support of the employer-provided exclusion moot and further justifying 
repeal of I.R.C. § 106.18 As a result, Part III suggests that I.R.C. § 106 
warrants substantial reform.19 
                                                                                                                      
9 See infra notes 243–310 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 243–301 and accompanying text (suggesting that the ACA largely ac-
complishes the goals of I.R.C. § 106). 
11 See infra notes 243–310 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 311–334 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 312–321 and accompanying text (indicating how certain taxpayers 
could be negatively impacted by a complete repeal of I.R.C. § 106). 
14 See infra notes 322–334 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits of converting 
I.R.C. § 106 into a progressive, refundable tax credit). 
15 See infra notes 20–104 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 105–146 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 147–236 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 237–310 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 311–334 and accompanying text. 
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I. Section 106 of the I.R.C. and Its Underlying  
Policy Considerations 
 The I.R.C. directly intersects with the U.S. health care system.20 
The federal income tax exclusion for employer-provided health insur-
ance is one example of this intersection.21 This provision was enacted 
more than half a century ago and has never undergone significant revi-
sion.22 Part I begins in Section A by introducing I.R.C. § 106, specifi-
cally highlighting its role, purpose, and budgetary consequences.23 Sec-
tion B then illustrates the policy considerations that support preserving 
I.R.C. § 106.24 
A. Section 106 of the I.R.C.: A Tax Expenditure 
 Raising revenues is arguably the predominant goal of the federal 
tax system.25 Notwithstanding this primary goal, policymakers have iden-
tified alternative objectives that have also shaped the design of the tax 
system.26 For example, policymakers have established a series of tax in-
centives that are specifically designed to promote social justice.27 Al-
though the benefits these provisions provide would ordinarily fall within 
the concept of “income,”28 they subsidize certain desirable endeavors, 
such as obtaining an education, or incentivize certain social and eco-
                                                                                                                      
20 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006) (excluding general payouts under U.S. citizens’ in-
surance plans from the federal income tax); id. § 105(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (exclud-
ing payouts under employer-provided insurance plans from the federal income tax); id. 
§ 106(a) (2006) (excluding employer contributions to employer-provided insurance plans 
from the federal income tax); id. § 3121(a)(2) (2006) (excluding employer contributions 
to employer-provided insurance plans from payroll taxes). 
21 See id. § 106(a). 
22 See Singleton, supra note 3, at 310–12. 
23 See infra notes 25–47 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 48–104 and accompanying text. 
25 Thomas J. Purcell, III, An Analysis of the Formation of Federal Income Tax Policy, 18 
Creighton L. Rev. 653, 653 & n.1 (1985). The income tax, including both individual and 
corporate, represents the largest source of revenue for the federal government—single-
handedly accounting for over 50% of federal revenues. See Taxes, Tariffs and Fees: How Gov-
ernment Raises Money, Ctr. Forward Budget Basics, Mar. 2012, at 1, 1, available at 
http://www.center-forward.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Budget-Basics-Revenues-
03-12-update-2.pdf. 
26 See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A 
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 706 (1970). 
27 Purcell, supra note 25, at 653 & n.3; Surrey, supra note 26, at 706. 
28 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Legislator Named Sue: Re-Imagining the Income Tax, 5 J. 
Gender Race & Just. 289, 313 & n.54 (2002); Surrey, supra note 26, at 706. 
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nomic behavior, such as acquiring insurance.29 These provisions— in-
cluding various exclusions, credits, and deductions—are commonly re-
ferred to as “tax expenditures”30 because they are functionally identical 
to direct federal spending programs.31 
 Classifying these special provisions as the functional equivalents of 
direct federal spending influences how policymakers view tax expendi-
tures.32 As opposed to treating these provisions as standard revenue-
raising tax provisions, it has become generally accepted that these pro-
visions should instead be evaluated alongside direct federal spending 
programs.33 Scrutinizing tax expenditures as a federal spending pro-
gram allows policymakers to address and control their growth.34 Today, 
indirect federal spending in the form of tax expenditures is estimated 
at $1 trillion per year.35 This amount exceeds the federal government’s 
annual spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—each of 
which cost $700–$800 billion annually.36 
 The exclusion from gross income for employer-provided health 
insurance is one such tax expenditure whose merits have been hotly 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Paul R. McDaniel et al., Federal Income Taxation 354 (Robert C. Clark et 
al. eds., 6th ed. 2008); Surrey, supra note 26, at 706, 711 n.3, 713. 
30 Surrey, supra note 26, at 706. In addition to the exclusion from income, tax expendi-
tures can also take the form of a deduction, credit, preferential tax rate, or even a tax de-
ferral. Id. The core tax expenditure attribute common to each of these approaches is typi-
cally the policy decision that a taxpayer’s tax burden should be reduced in order to 
encourage certain behavior or reduce hardship. See id. at 711–13. 
31 Id. at 706, 713–14. For example, granting a taxpayer an exclusion from federal in-
come tax for a specific benefit is essentially the same as if the taxpayer had been otherwise 
traditionally taxed, but was then directly reimbursed by the federal government for the 
amount of the benefit. McDaniel et al., supra note 29, at 20; Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure 
Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 Hastings L.J. 407, 410 (1999). The term “tax ex-
penditure” is thus a concise and descriptive way of capturing the reality that indirect fed-
eral spending is accomplished within the tax system. McDaniel et al., supra note 29, at 
20; see Sugin, supra, at 410; Surrey, supra note 26, at 706. 
32 Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, the Constitution, and the Courts: The Use of 
Tax Expenditure Analysis in Judicial Decision Making, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 855, 859–61, 
864 (1993); Sugin, supra note 31, at 416. 
33 Adler, supra note 32, at 859–61, 861 & n.23; see also Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madi-
son and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institu-
tions, 102 Yale L.J. 1165, 1165 (1993) (describing the success of tax expenditure analysis). 
Case in point: the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 mandates that a tax expenditure 
analysis be included in every budget submitted to Congress. See 2 U.S.C. § 602(a), (e)(1) 
(2006); Adler, supra note 32, at 861. 
34 See Rogers, supra note 3, at 899. 
35 See id. 
36 Id. 
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debated.37 Section 106 excludes all employer contributions to a health 
or accident plan from an employee’s income.38 Although employer-
provided health insurance would otherwise be characterized as a tax-
able in-kind benefit, the exclusion for employer-provided health insur-
ance is one of a number of provisions that are designed to generate 
incentives for employers to provide their employees with certain bene-
fits.39 This particular provision promotes social justice by increasing 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 Compare, e.g., Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable for the Long Run: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 116th Cong. 4 (2011) [hereinafter Making Medi-
care, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable] (testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, 
Brookings Institution) (arguing for the repeal of I.R.C. § 106), and Eleanor Weston Brown, 
Healing Healthcare Through Tax Reform, 2 Regent J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 63, 78–81 (2010) (de-
scribing the arguments for reforming I.R.C. § 106), with Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 204, 211, 
212 (arguing against the repeal of the exclusion). See generally Sugin, supra note 3 (arguing 
that the repeal of tax expenditures is a flawed approach to tax reform). The exclusion or 
“exclusions” for employer-provided health insurance can refer to a number of different tax 
provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 105(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (excluding payouts on em-
ployer-provided insurance plans from the federal income tax); id. § 106(a) (2006) (exclud-
ing employer contributions to employer-provided insurance plans from the federal income 
tax); id. § 3121(a)(2) (excluding employer contributions to employer-provided insurance 
plans from payroll taxes); Allegra N. Kim, Cal. Research Bureau, Pub. No. CRB 07-002, 
Federal Tax Incentives for Health Insurance 1 (2003); Gamage, supra note 4, at 680–
81 & nn.47–48; Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Taxes and Healthcare, Tax Notes, Aug. 31, 2009, at 
889, 889 n.4, 892 & n.20. Although I.R.C. § 105 is technically an exclusion related to em-
ployer-provided insurance, it is only given purpose through its relation to I.R.C. § 106. See 
Lawrence A. Frolik, Personal Injury Compensation as a Tax Preference, 37 Me. L. Rev. 1, 2, 6–7 
(1985) (discussing the function of I.R.C. § 105); Julie E. McGuire, Comment, Proposed Sec-
tion 125 Cafeteria Plan Regulations: Invalidating Certain Section 105 Medical Plans Through 
Forfeiture Requirement, 23 Duq. L. Rev. 659, 661–65 (1985) (discussing the interrelationship 
between I.R.C. §§ 104, 105 and 106). This is because an additional provision, I.R.C. § 104, 
provides for the exclusion from income for payouts on insurance plans more generally. See 
I.R.C. § 104(a) (2006). Thus, any discussion of the propriety of the “exclusions” for em-
ployer-provided insurance truly focuses on I.R.C. § 106, as I.R.C. § 105 essentially mirrors 
the typical treatment of insurance payouts. See I.R.C. §§ 104–106(a); Frolik, supra, at 2–7; 
McGuire, supra. As a result, this Note focuses on I.R.C. § 106—the operative exclusion. In 
addition to the exclusion from the federal income tax, there is also an entirely separate 
exclusion for employer-provided insurance that is beyond the scope of this Note—the 
exclusion for employer-provided insurance from payroll taxes. See I.R.C. § 3121(a)(2); Kim, 
supra; Gamage, supra note 4, at 681 & n.48; Wiedenbeck, supra, at 892 & n.20. Payroll taxes 
are imposed on both the employee and the employer, are generally calculated in relation 
to the employee’s wages, and include payments for Social Security and Medicare. See I.R.C. 
§ 3101(a), (b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); id. § 3111(a), (b) (2006); id. § 3301 (2006 & Supp. 
III 2009); Kim, supra; Gamage, supra note 4, at 681 & n.48; Wiedenbeck, supra, at 892 & 
n.20. This Note does not contemplate reform or repeal of the payroll tax exclusion, and 
instead focuses solely on I.R.C. § 106. Hence, unless stated otherwise, references to the 
“exclusion” for employer-provided insurance pertain exclusively to I.R.C. § 106. 
38 I.R.C. § 106(a). This includes premiums paid by an employer. McDaniel et al., su-
pra note 29, at 119–20. 
39 See McDaniel et al., supra note 29, at 119–20; Surrey, supra note 26, at 706. Other 
similarly designed exclusions include those for educational and adoption assistance, 
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health insurance coverage and reducing the number of uninsured citi-
zens.40 Regardless of its efficiency, employer-provided health insurance 
is irrefutably popular; a 2007 U.S. Census Bureau report revealed that 
employment-related health insurance plans cover almost 60% of in-
sured Americans.41 
 The exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is one of 
the largest individual tax expenditures.42 A report from Congress’s 
Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that between 2011 and 2015, 
this expenditure will cost the federal government $725 billion.43 Schol-
ars have previously debated the exclusion’s propriety.44 Detractors ques-
tion its efficacy and efficiency in achieving its purported goals; they 
note its potential unfairness,45 and point to the large loss of potential 
revenues associated with the exclusion.46 In contrast, proponents of the 
exclusion have warned against its repeal, cautioning that it would be 
unwise to abolish such a pervasive system.47 
B. Policy Considerations in Support of I.R.C. § 106 
 A variety of traditional policy considerations are advanced to sup-
port preserving I.R.C. § 106.48 Subsection 1 discusses how I.R.C. § 106 
provides a benefit to employers by controlling their costs.49 Subsection 
                                                                                                                      
among others. McDaniel et al., supra note 29, at 119. Each of these exclusions is the 
result of a congressional policy decision to advance certain desirable social goals. Id. 
40 See Singleton, supra note 3, at 312. Moreover, the large numbers of uninsured Ameri-
cans has been shown to adversely impact the national economy. See Louise G. Trubek, New 
Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 Ind. Health L. Rev. 139, 142 (2006) (noting 
that a lack of insurance coverage shifts costs onto the government and employers, results in 
increased taxes, and encourages job lock—in which employees remain with their current 
employers in order to keep their coverage). 
41 See DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 1, at 20. 
42 Harry L. Gutman, How to Think About Real Tax Reform, Tax Notes, Aug. 6, 2012, at 
695, 700. Other significant tax expenditures for individuals include the charitable contri-
bution deduction, the home mortgage interest deduction, and the deduction for state and 
local taxes, among others. See id. 
43 See Joint Comm. on Taxation 2012, supra note 1, at 42. 
44 See, e.g., Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable, supra note 37, at 4 
(testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution); Brown, supra note 37, 
at 78–81; Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 204, 211, 212. 
45 See, e.g., Lyke, supra note 4, at 17, 19 (indicating that I.R.C. § 106 is unfair because it 
produces vertical and horizontal inequities); Brown, supra note 37, at 78–79 (same); Sin-
gleton, supra note 3, at 332 (same). 
46 See Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable, supra note 37, at 4 (testi-
mony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution); Lyke, supra note 4, at 1. 
47 See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 204, 211, 212. 
48 See infra notes 53–104 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
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2 then presents the argument that the employer-provided insurance 
regime is the most effective means of constraining health care costs.50 
Subsection 3 illustrates the argument that I.R.C. § 106 provides the best 
available means of risk pooling.51 Finally, Subsection 4 discusses how a 
majority of insured Americans, by virtue of their coverage under an 
employer-provided insurance plan, benefit from I.R.C. § 106.52 
1. I.R.C. § 106 Benefits Employers 
 Discussions regarding I.R.C. § 106 often focus on the employees 
because of the direct benefit that they receive through the reduction of 
their taxable income by the value of their employer-provided cover-
age.53 I.R.C. § 106, however, also provides a benefit to employers, albeit 
an indirect one.54 By exempting employer-provided health insurance 
from employee taxation, employers who provide insurance are able to 
provide employees with the same value in benefits at a lower cost to the 
employer, thereby allowing them to pay their employees lower wages.55 
Consequently, it is argued that repealing I.R.C. § 106 could harm em-
ployers.56 For example, the repeal of Section 106 could result in a sub-
sequent demand from employees that their wages be adjusted in order 
to compensate for the loss of their tax benefit.57 Accordingly, the pres-
ervation of I.R.C. § 106 may thus benefit employers by keeping down 
their costs.58 
                                                                                                                      
50 See infra notes 59–71 and accompanying text. 
51 See infra notes 72–96 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 97–104 and accompanying text. 
53 See Sugin, supra note 3, at 22; see also Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 889 & n.4 (ex-
pounding on the direct benefits to employees). 
54 See Sugin, supra note 3, at 21. This is distinguishable from the payroll tax exclusion 
for employer-provided health insurance, which provides a direct benefit to employers in 
the form of lower taxes. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 892; see also Robert Gillette et al., 
The Impact of Repealing the Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Insurance, 63 Nat’l Tax. J. 695, 
700 (2010) (distinguishing between the consequences of repealing solely I.R.C. § 106 and 
repealing both I.R.C. § 106 and the payroll tax exclusion). In contrast, I.R.C. § 106 pro-
vides an indirect benefit to employers by allowing them to pay employees lower wages. See 
Sugin, supra note 3, at 22. Section 106 of the I.R.C. and the payroll tax exclusion are two 
independently operating provisions. See Gamage, supra note 4, at 680–81; supra note 37 
(discussing the differences between the payroll tax and federal income tax exclusions). 
55 Sugin, supra note 3, at 22. If employers were forced to provide the value of health 
care benefits in the form of taxable, monetary income, employers would need to spend 
more money to offset the tax that the employee would be assessed. See id. at 21–22. 
56 See id. at 21. 
57 Id. at 22. 
58 See id. 
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2. Section 106 of the I.R.C. Provides the Most Effective Means of 
Constraining Health Care Costs 
 Another policy consideration supporting I.R.C. § 106 is that, al-
though it may be flawed, the provision provides the best method of 
constraining health care costs.59 One scholar notes that the U.S. politi-
cal system is simply incapable of saying “no” to demands for medical 
services.60 One reason that policymakers may not develop meaningful 
reforms to combat rising health care costs is because politicians per-
ceive that they are beholden to their constituents.61 Fearing for their 
job security, they are incapable and unwilling to constrain the costs of 
health care.62 
 Whereas politicians shy away from reining in health care costs in 
order to preserve their jobs, employers are both capable and willing to 
curb costs because doing so is critical to marketplace survival.63 For ex-
ample, the need to cut costs has led to employer-sponsored “wellness” 
programs.64 These programs, implemented by employers, are designed 
to reduce the demand and costs of health care by incentivizing preven-
tive behavior, such as exercise and healthy dieting.65 Employers have 
enacted further measures to minimize costs, such as health reimburse-
                                                                                                                      
59 Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 204, 211, 212; see Yevgeniy Feyman, How to Control Health-
Care Costs?, Nat’l Review Online (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview. 
com/articles/333627/how-control-health-care-costs-yevgeniy-feyman (arguing that Con-
gress should defer to the private sector with regard to controlling health care costs, as 
businesses have unique incentives to control costs effectively); see also Cong. Budget Of-
fice, Pub. No. 4507, The 2012 Long-Term Budget Outlook 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 
Long-Term Budget Outlook] (reporting that within twenty-five years, federal spending 
on health care and Social Security will increase by $850 billion per year); Brendan W. 
Miller, Note, Your Money or Your Lifestyle!: Employers’ Efforts to Contain Healthcare Costs—
Lifestyle Discrimination Against Dependents of Employees?, 5 Ind. Health L. Rev. 371, 372, 374 
(2008) (illustrating that employers have a unique incentive to control health care costs). 
60 See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 206, 209 (suggesting that politicians fail to confront the 
reality that medical services must be reduced to control health care costs). 
61 See id. at 210. 
62 See id. (observing that politicians’ desire to remain in the good graces of their con-
stituents is what prevents them from being able to make the difficult decisions to curb 
health care outlays). 
63 See id. at 211; see also Miller, supra note 59, at 372–74 (arguing that businesses have 
unique incentives to control costs effectively); Feyman, supra note 59 (same). 
64 Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 211–12. 
65 Id.; Miller, supra note 59, at 391–93. It is simply more cost-effective for employers to 
support these wellness programs than to allow the demand and costs of health care to 
grow unchecked. See Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 211–12. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
although anecdotal evidence suggests that these programs have been successful in improv-
ing overall employee health, the benefits of wellness programs have yet to be comprehen-
sively studied. Id. at 211. 
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ment arrangements (“HRAs”),66 flexible spending accounts (“FSAs”),67 
and health savings accounts (“HSAs”).68 These employer-created pro-
grams are designed to control health care expenditures by forcing em-
ployees to incur some of their health care costs, which should lead 
them to make more cost-conscious decisions.69 These programs thus 
provide cost-saving incentives for employees to economize their health 
care expenses.70 Regardless of their advantages or limitations, em-
ployer-sponsored programs are proof that employers have greater in-
centives to control the costs of health care than do politicians.71 
3. Section 106 of the I.R.C. Maintains the Best Available Device for Risk 
Pooling 
 Proponents of this exclusion also forward a third traditional policy 
consideration for employer-provided health insurance: that this para-
digm provides for, and maintains the only viable risk-pooling system for 
the majority of Americans.72 Proponents of the exclusions view the cur-
                                                                                                                      
66 See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Insurance—Riding the Health Care Tiger, 355 
New Eng. J. Med. 195, 197 (2006). Employees who are enrolled in high-deductible health 
plans can use HRAs. Id. An HRA is essentially a line of credit that an employer extends to 
employees in order to cover a designated amount of the employee’s out-of-pocket health 
care expenses. Id. 
67 Dylan Young, Flexible Spending Accounts: An Introduction, Health 401k (Sept. 24, 2011), 
http://www.health401k.com/2011/09/flexible-spending-accounts-an-introduction/. FSAs 
allow employees to set aside a portion of their income to use on health care expenditures. Id. 
These accounts are typically used to supplement traditional insurance coverage Id. The dis-
advantage of FSAs is that they impose a “use it or lose it” rule, under which taxpayers forfeit 
their remaining FSA funds at the end of a given “coverage period.” Id. On the other hand, 
funds kept in an FSA have the benefit of not being taxed. Id. 
68 Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 211. Health savings accounts are similar to flexible spend-
ing accounts. See Young supra note 67. One major difference is that HSAs are not subject to 
the “use it or lose it” rule. Young supra note 67. Nevertheless, an employee has to be en-
rolled in a high-deductible health plan in order to take advantage of a HSA. Blumenthal, 
supra note 66, at 197. 
69 See Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 893–95. 
70 See id. 
71 Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 211. Section 106 is credited with promoting this positive ex-
ternality because one of the primary reasons that employers began to—and continue to—
provide insurance is due to its tax favorability. Gamage, supra note 4, at 676; see Lyke, supra 
note 4, at 10–11. Similarly, it is beneficial for employees to enroll in employer-provided 
insurance, as opposed to receiving additional cash wages, because of its tax favorability. See 
Brown, supra note 37, at 80. Thus, repeal of I.R.C. § 106 may threaten this arrangement. 
See Lyke, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
72 Lyke, supra note 4, at 11, 18; see U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-
1009SP, Understanding the Tax Reform Debate: Background, Criteria, & Ques-
tions 20 (2005) [hereinafter GAO]; John L. Buckley, Tax Expenditure Reform: Some Common 
Misconceptions, Tax Notes, Jul. 18, 2011, at 255, 268. 
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rent employer-provided health insurance paradigm as a vital alternative 
to the individual market.73 The reason for this is that the individual 
market suffers from a number of core deficiencies that produce more 
costly and poorer quality insurance.74 
 First, the individual market suffers from “adverse selection.”75 Ad-
verse selection occurs because, typically, healthy people have less incen-
tive to purchase health insurance than unhealthy people, who may view 
insurance as a good deal.76 Consequently, the health profiles of a stan-
dard insurance market will be disproportionately made up of unhealthy 
patrons.77 Higher costs and larger premiums are the inevitable result of 
the growing disparity between unhealthy and healthy people in an in-
surance market.78 This eventuality leads to a self-propagating cycle, 
whereby increasingly greater numbers of healthy patrons will leave an 
insurance market as ever-rising premiums reflect the health profiles of 
the market.79 
 The second issue affecting the individual market is “risk classifica-
tion.”80 This is a practice that insurance companies engage in to safe-
guard against adverse selection.81 Insurance companies generate risk 
profiles for their potential consumers, identify unhealthy or at-risk pa-
trons, and then either charge them exorbitant costs, or deny them cov-
erage entirely.82 These companies are then generally able to charge 
healthy patrons lower premiums, thereby maximizing profits.83 
 Plagued by these twin issues, the individual market is wrought with 
lower quality and higher cost insurance than the group market offered 
through employers.84 According to one study, in 2005, almost three out 
                                                                                                                      
73 See GAO, supra note 72, at 20; Lyke, supra note 4, at 11, 18; Buckley, supra note 72, at 
268; see also Gamage, supra note 4, at 676–80 (discussing how the employer-provided insur-
ance paradigm resolves many of the drawbacks inherent in the individual insurance market). 
The term “individual market” collectively describes the group of insureds who purchase in-
surance directly, as opposed to receiving it from their employers or the government. 
Gamage, supra note 4, at 678. 
74 Gamage, supra note 4, at 678. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 677. 
77 See id. 
78 Id.; Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-in Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1733, 1770–71 
(2011) (describing how adverse selection results in higher premiums). 
79 Gamage, supra note 4, at 677. 
80 Id. at 678. 
81 Id. at 677. 
82 Id. at 677–78. 
83 Id. at 678. 
84 Id.; see also Maher, supra note 78, at 1771 (indicating that employers are able to avoid 
the problem of adverse selection). 
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of five individuals were reportedly unable to procure affordable health 
insurance in the individual market because they were charged exorbi-
tant prices, had a prior-existing health problem that precluded them 
from coverage, or were simply denied coverage outright.85 
 In contrast, I.R.C. § 106 and employer-provided insurance work 
together to avoid the drawbacks of the individual market, resulting in 
better quality and more affordable insurance.86 The reason that em-
ployer-provided health insurance provides an optimal risk pool is be-
cause employees become insured by virtue of their employment—not 
because they require health care.87 In addition, the tax exclusion incen-
tivizes employees to enroll in employer-provided insurance.88 These fac-
tors provide a balance between both healthy and unhealthy people, re-
sulting in reasonable, shared costs.89 Furthermore, employer-provided 
insurance specifically results in affordable care for the at-risk and un-
healthy because it avoids the problem of risk classification.90 Although 
employers are technically able to design insurance policies that exclude 
high-cost employees or charge them more, in practice, employers pro-
vide a more egalitarian regime.91 
 Repealing the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance 
would remove one of the primary incentives that encourage employees 
to enroll in employer-provided insurance.92 It is therefore reasonable to 
fear that this may threaten the stable risk pool that employers have been 
able to provide workers.93 By repealing I.R.C. § 106, health care premi-
ums could rise as healthy people opt out of insurance and thereby 
                                                                                                                      
85 Gamage, supra note 4, at 677. 
86 See id. at 679–80. 
87 See id. at 679; Maher, supra note 78, at 1771. 
88 Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 696; see Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Re-
sponsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of American Health Care, 36 McGeorge L. 
Rev. 535, 546 (2005); Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 899 & n.4. 
89 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 680. 
90 See id. at 679–80. 
91 See id. Employers are incentivized to behave this way due to the perception that this 
benefits employee morale, which in turn benefits employers. See id. 
92 See Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 696; Kaplan, supra note 88, at 546; Wiedenbeck, 
supra note 37, at 899 & n.4. 
93 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 11; Buckley, supra note 72, at 268 (suggesting that policy-
makers need to consider the impact of repealing or reforming I.R.C. § 106 on the avail-
ability of employer-provided insurance); see also Cong. Budget Office, The Tax Treat-
ment of Employment-Based Health Insurance 48 (1994) [hereinafter Tax Treatment 
of Employment-Based Health Insurance] (suggesting that repealing both of the exclu-
sions for employer-provided insurance would cause employers to be much less likely to 
offer insurance, which would thereby cause older and sicker people to have more diffi-
cultly in obtaining affordable insurance). 
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weaken the risk pool.94 Those most burdened by these changes would 
be the unhealthy and at-risk, who could no longer look to the workplace 
as a form of affordable and effective risk pooling.95 These individuals 
would once again face prohibitively high health insurance premiums.96 
4. The Majority of Insured Americans Receive Employer-Provided 
Insurance and Therefore Benefit from I.R.C. § 106 
 Another prominent policy consideration in favor of preserving 
I.R.C. § 106 hinges on the fact that employer-provided health insurance 
is so pervasive and that, therefore, a large number of taxpayers benefit 
from this exclusion.97 As of 2008, 163 million Americans received em-
ployer-provided insurance, whereas only 17 million were insured in the 
individual market.98 Thus, 163 million Americans directly benefit from 
I.R.C. § 106 by being able to reduce their taxable income by the value 
                                                                                                                      
94 Compare Lyke, supra note 4, at 11 (describing the fear that risk pools may be threat-
ened because of changes to I.R.C. § 106), and Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 899 & n.4 
(indicating that a primary reason employer-provided insurance has become so popular is 
because of the beneficial tax treatment that it receives), with Gamage, supra note 4, at 677–
80 (illustrating how employer-provided insurance was able to avoid the problem of adverse 
selection by enticing healthy employees to become insured and describing the effect on 
premiums as risk pools become disproportionately populated by unhealthy insureds). 
95 See Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 93, at 
48; see also Gamage, supra note 4, at 677–80 (describing the problems associated with the 
individual market and how the employer-provided paradigm is able to avoid these issues); 
Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 899 (describing how the employer-provided paradigm is 
able to avoid the problem of adverse selection and keep insurance costs down). When 
healthy employees opt out of coverage, risk pools become disproportionately populated by 
unhealthy people, and premiums are adjusted upward to reflect the increased costs. See 
Gamage, supra note 4, at 677. Employers respond in a number of ways to this phenome-
non. See Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 93, at 
23–25. In general, as premiums rise, employers are less likely to offer health insurance. See 
id. at 25. Furthermore, employers may discriminate against hiring unhealthy workers, re-
vise insurance packages of employees to exempt certain illnesses from coverage, or even 
fire unhealthy workers. See id. at 23–24. 
96 Tax Treatment of Employment-Based Health Insurance, supra note 93, at 48; 
see Gamage, supra note 4, at 677–79 (describing the perils that unhealthy workers face in 
the individual market); Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 899 (same). 
97 See Roundtable on Financing Healthcare Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 114th 
Cong. 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter Roundtable on Financing Healthcare Reform] (statement of Leo-
nard E. Burman, Director, Tax Policy Center) (illustrating the fear that repealing the exclu-
sion would result in millions losing insurance coverage); Joe, supra note 5, at 1322 (illustrat-
ing that some argue that the repeal of I.R.C. § 106 is undesirable, as it would raise taxes on 
millions of middle-class Americans); Michael Tanner & Chris Edwards, Will Obama Raise Mid-
dle-Class Taxes to Fund Health Care?, Cato Inst. Tax & Budget Bull., June 2009, at 1, 1, avail-
able at http://www.cato.org/doc-download/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/tbb_0609-57.pdf 
(same). 
98 Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 696. 
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of their employer-provided coverage.99 Considering the fact that the 
average cost of employer-provided insurance is roughly $4750 a year for 
an individual and $12,700 for family coverage, I.R.C. § 106 provides 
significant relief for many Americans.100 
 As a result, tampering with I.R.C. § 106 risks negatively impacting 
millions of Americans.101 Given the average cost of employer-provided 
coverage, the potential increased tax burden on Americans could be 
significant.102 In addition, one recent study indicates that repeal of 
I.R.C. § 106 would lead to a 5.8% erosion of coverage under employer-
provided insurance.103 The implications of this are predicted to result 
in nearly 3.9 million individuals losing health insurance coverage en-
tirely, and over 4.7 million individuals procuring alternative insurance 
in place of their former employer-provided insurance.104 
                                                                                                                      
99 Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 889 & n.4. 
100 Lyke, supra note 4, at 1. 
101 See Joe, supra note 5, at 1322; Tanner & Edwards, supra note 97, at 1. 
102 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 1; Tanner & Edwards, supra note 97, at 1. 
103 See Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 704–05; see also Roundtable on Financing Healthcare 
Reform, supra note 97, at 5–6 (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Director, Tax Policy Cen-
ter) (illustrating the fear that repeal of the exclusion would result in millions losing insur-
ance coverage). 
104 See Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 702 n.9, 704; see also Roundtable on Financing 
Healthcare Reform, supra note 97, at 5–6 (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Director, Tax 
Policy Center). According to the study, this 5.8% erosion from employer-provided insur-
ance is the result of two factors: employers dropping coverage and employees voluntarily 
switching out of employer coverage. See Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 700. The study re-
lied on a “voting” system, whereby employees compared the cost of coverage pursuant to 
their employer-provided health insurance with the cost of alternative coverage—in this 
case, the coverage available on the ACA exchanges. See id. at 699. If alternative coverage 
was cheaper, employees voted for employers to drop coverage and would choose to volun-
tarily leave their employer-provided coverage. See id. at 699–700. Of particular concern to 
this Note are the 3.9 million individuals who not only would leave employer coverage, but 
would also become completely uninsured because of repeal of I.R.C. § 106. See id. at 702 
n.9, 704. A follow-up with one of the study’s authors revealed some potential noteworthy 
features of this group. See E-mail from Robert Gillette, Dir. of Econ. Modeling & Computer 
Applications, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, to author (Feb. 27, 2013, 16:01 
EST) [hereinafter E-mail from Robert Gillette] (on file with author). According to this 
scholar, upon repeal, young employees were one group that would choose to neither con-
tinue employer coverage nor purchase alternative coverage in the exchanges. See id. These 
individuals would instead choose to become uninsured, despite the penalty imposed by the 
ACA. See id. The explanation for this phenomenon is that when faced with the options of 
being subjected to either full taxation of employer benefits or community ratings in the 
exchanges, these individuals would choose to forgo coverage entirely. See id. 
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II. The New Health Care Landscape and Its Impact on the 
Policy Considerations of I.R.C. § 106 
 In stark contrast to the static U.S. tax code, the health care land-
scape has recently undergone one of the most expansive legislative 
overhauls in decades.105 The ACA implements a variety of provisions 
aimed at restructuring the U.S. health care system.106 Given the direct 
impact that the federal income tax exclusion for employer-provided 
insurance has on the health insurance market, the effects of the ACA 
may bear on the continued relevance of I.R.C. § 106.107 Section A of 
Part II begins by providing a detailed discussion of how the ACA is pre-
dicted to impact the health care landscape.108 Section B then examines 
whether traditional arguments advanced in support of repealing I.R.C. 
§ 106 remain persuasive in light of the ACA.109 
A. A Dramatically Altered Health Care Landscape 
 Recent legislation has dramatically altered the context in which 
prior arguments for and against the repeal of I.R.C. § 106 were 
couched.110 On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into 
law the ACA,111 now commonly referred to as “Obamacare.”112 The 
ACA provides for widespread health insurance reforms, gradually en-
acted over the course of several years.113 These reforms have already 
                                                                                                                      
 
105 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a 
Flourish, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19. 
106 See Caitlin B. Munley, The Effects of Immigration Reform on the Cost Projections for the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 719, 719 (2012) (describing the 
ACA as “a major overhaul of the United States' health care system”); infra notes 113–146 
and accompanying text (expounding upon these particular provisions). 
107 See Joe, supra note 5, at 1322 (suggesting that I.R.C. § 106 should be reevaluated in 
light of the ACA). 
108 See infra notes 110–146 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 147–236 and accompanying text. 
110 See Joe, supra note 5, at 1322. 
111 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Miller, supra note 7, at 28. 
112 See Gregory Wallace, ‘Obamacare’: The Word That Defined the Health Care Debate, CNN 
(last updated June 25, 2012, 1:20 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2012-06-25/politics/politics_ 
obamacare-word-debate_1_health-reform-law-health-care-affordable-care-act?_s=pm:poli- 
tics. 
113 See Frederick Thide, Comment, In Search of Limiting Principles: The Eleventh Circuit 
Invalidates the Individual Mandate in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 359, 361 (2012); U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Key Features of 
the Affordable Care Act by Year, HHS.gov/HealthCare, http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/ 
facts/timeline/timeline-text.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2013); Kate Pickert, What Obama’s 
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begun to take shape, but the most critical provisions of the ACA will not 
take effect until 2014.114 Some of the primary goals of the ACA include: 
(1) curbing the cost of health care;115 (2) facilitating and ensuring uni-
versal health insurance coverage;116 and (3) holding insurance compa-
nies more accountable.117 
 The ACA implements virtually every approach to constraining 
health care costs that has been suggested by leading experts.118 For ex-
ample, the ACA specifically focuses on encouraging and promoting the 
use of preventive measures as a long-term method of reducing health 
care outlays.119 Insurance plans are now required to cover the cost of 
certain designated preventive services in full,120 such as mammograms 
and colonoscopies.121 
 Another ACA cost-control strategy is to streamline the U.S. health 
care system to improve its efficiency.122 The ACA provides direct incen-
tives for physicians to constrain costs through “Accountable Care Or-
ganizations.”123 Such organizations are comprised of doctors who will 
coordinate their care practices in an effort to both improve quality and 
                                                                                                                      
Re-election Means for Health Care, Time (Nov. 8, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/ 
11/08/what-obamas-re-election-means-for-health-care/. 
114 See Pickert, supra note 113. 
115 Miller, supra note 7, at 28. 
116 Dolgin & Dieterich, supra note 7, at 52. 
117 Kathleen Sebelius, Holding Insurance Companies Accountable for High Premium In-
creases, Huffington Post (Feb. 22, 2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sec-
kathleen-sebelius/holding-insurance-compani_b_2742501.html. 
118 Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363 New 
Eng. J. Med. 601, 603 (2010). 
119 See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1577, 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120 (2011); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring health insurance plans to provide coverage 
for certain preventive services). 
120 Baker, supra note 119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13. In 
addition, the ACA created a “National Prevention, Health Promotion, and Public Health 
Council” to promote the health of Americans by supporting established prevention and 
public health programs, including those that combat the issues of smoking and obesity. 
Lance Gable, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Health, and the Elusive Target 
of Human Rights, 39 J.L. Med. & Ethics 340, 344 (2011); see 42 U.S.C. § 300u-11 (Supp. IV 
2010). 
121 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 113. 
122 See Utah Health Policy Project, We’ll Show You Cost Containment: How 
Federal Health Reform Will Help Reel in Health Care Costs 2 (2011), http:// 
www.healthpolicyproject.org/Publications_files/National/Cost%20Containment%20in% 
20ACA%207-26-1.pdf [hereinafter Utah Health Policy Project]. 
123 Timothy C. Gutwald, Bending the Health Care Cost Curve: Incentivizing Quality and Effi-
ciency, Mich. B.J., June 2011, at 20, 22; Everette James & Arthur S. Levine, The Inevitability 
of Health Reform, 50 Duq. L. Rev. 235, 242 (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (Supp. IV 2010). 
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reduce spending.124 To the degree that these organizations are success-
ful in reducing costs, members will be entitled to keep a percentage of 
the savings.125 Finally, the law expands the authorization of “payment 
bundling,” a pilot program that incentivizes cost cutting.126 The current 
payment system is fragmented and inefficient because each service or 
test is billed separately.127 This process drives up costs.128 In contrast, 
under payment bundling, “episodes of care” are instead collectively 
billed at a flat rate.129 A flat rate will promote more efficient health care, 
thus reducing costs.130 
 The ACA also employs a variety of tools that are designed to facili-
tate and encourage universal health care coverage.131 These are some 
of the ACA’s most controversial provisions.132 The provisions that go 
into effect in 2014 expand on the ACA’s commitment to preventing 
discrimination by universally prohibiting insurance companies from 
refusing to grant or extend insurance coverage due to a person’s preex-
isting conditions.133 In addition, the 2014 provisions are designed to 
ensure affordable health care for all Americans through a graduated 
subsidization scheme.134 To the extent that an individual is unable to 
                                                                                                                      
 
124 James & Levine, supra note 123, at 242. 
125 Gutwald, supra note 123, at 22; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d). 
126 James & Levine, supra note 123, at 244; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603; 
Michael Skindrud & Todd Cleary, Health-Care Reform: What You Should Know, Wis. Law., 
Dec. 2011, at 12, 52; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (Supp. IV 2010). 
127 James & Levine, supra note 123, at 241–42. 
128 See id. 
129 Id. at 244. 
130 See id. at 245–46; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603. For example, whereas a 
surgical procedure under the traditional payment paradigm would generate a variety of 
claims stemming from multiple providers, under the new system surgical procedures will be 
compensated by bundled payments—incentivizing a more efficient delivery of health care. 
Cf. Maria T. Currier & Morris H. Miller, Medicare Payment Reform: Accelerating the Transformation 
of the U.S. Healthcare Delivery System and Need for New Strategic Provider Alliances, 22 Health Law. 
1, 2–3 (2010) (contrasting the fee-for-service and payment bundling paradigms). 
131 Thide, supra note 113, at 361–63. 
132 See Wendy E. Parmet, The Individual Mandate: Implications for Public Health Law, 39 
J.L. Med. & Ethics 401, 401 (2011) (highlighting the controversy over the individual 
mandate provision of the ACA). 
133 Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to Health 
Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1159, 1187; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 
(Supp. IV 2010). The 2014 provisions also prevent insurance companies from increasing 
rates in the individual or small group markets based on gender or health status. Roberts, 
supra; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (Supp. IV 2010). 
134 See 26 U.S.C. § 36B (Supp. IV 2010) (providing for tax credits to assist payment of 
ACA exchange premiums); Amy B. Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Cri-
tique of ACA, 36 J. Corp. L. 781, 783 & n.14 (2011); Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social 
Order: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. 
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afford health care, these new provisions are designed to close the gap 
between affordable costs and the actual cost of health care.135 Fur-
thermore, the ACA establishes “Affordable Insurance Exchanges,”136 
where individuals—who are not otherwise offered affordable insurance 
through their employers—will be able to directly purchase insur-
ance.137 The ACA also provides aid to small businesses in the form of 
tax credits designed to subsidize the cost of providing health insurance 
to their employees.138 Finally, the most controversial provision of the 
ACA is the individual mandate.139 The mandate dictates that individu-
als who are able to afford basic health insurance coverage must obtain 
it.140 A fee meant to mitigate the cost of caring for uninsured Ameri-
cans will be imposed on those who choose not to purchase affordable 
care despite their ability to afford it.141 Importantly though, individuals 
who are unable to acquire affordable coverage will be eligible for an 
exemption from the penalty.142 Budget analysts project that the ACA 
                                                                                                                      
Health & Biomedical L. 1, 12 (2011). For example, individuals who are not eligible for 
other forms of affordable coverage—and whose income falls between the poverty line and 
four times that amount—will be eligible to receive tax credits that will subsidize their in-
surance. Monahan, supra. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2012, $11,945 was 
the poverty threshold for an individual under the age of sixty-five, and $23,283 for a family 
of four with two children under the age of eighteen. Poverty, U.S. Census Bureau, http:// 
www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/threshld/ (last updated Sept. 17, 2013). 
135 See Monahan, supra note 134, at 783 & n.14; Rosenbaum, supra note 134, at 12. 
136 Jessica D.H. Allen, Note, A Way Forward: Establishing Financially Self-Sustaining Health-
Insurance Exchanges Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 773, 
775–76 (2013); Amy Siadak, Note, Contracting in Health Insurance Exchanges: Improving Im-
plementation with Lessons from the Past, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 867, 869 (2011); see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18031 (Supp. IV 2010). An “Affordable Insurance Exchange” is a new, alternative mar-
ketplace for individuals and small businesses to purchase qualified health benefit plans. 
Allen, supra, at 776. These exchanges are designed to increase the competitiveness, trans-
parency, and affordability of the insurance market. See Siadak, supra, at 869–70. 
137 Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–70; see 42 U.S.C. § 18031. These exchanges will offer 
a number of health plans, thereby allowing consumers to choose among a variety of pack-
ages. Siadak, supra note 136, at 870–71. 
138 Thide, supra note 113, at 361; see 26 U.S.C. § 45R (Supp. IV 2010). As of 2014, this 
provision will cover up to 35% of an employer’s contributions, and up to 25% of a non-
profit employer’s contributions. 42 U.S.C. § 45R(a)–(b). 
139 Parmet, supra note 132, at 401; see 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. IV 2010). 
140 Compare 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (requiring individual coverage), with 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(e) (exempting individuals who cannot afford coverage from the mandate). 
141 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 113; see 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)–(c) 
(imposing a penalty on those who forego coverage, which amounts to the greater of $695 
per person or 2.5% of family income). 
142 See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e). To be eligible for this exemption, the taxpayer’s health 
costs must amount to more than 8% of his or her household income. Id. 
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will reduce the number of uninsured non-elderly Americans by 24 mil-
lion between 2012 and 2016.143 
 Finally, the ACA also seeks to hold insurance companies more ac-
countable.144 Some provisions require insurance companies to spend a 
certain percentage of premium dollars on health care services and 
quality improvement.145 Failure to meet these standards results in the 
imposition of a penalty against insurance companies in the form of a 
rebate they must provide to their customers.146 
B. Policy Considerations for Repealing I.R.C. § 106 Through the  
Lens of the ACA 
 There have been a variety of policy considerations advanced in 
support of repealing I.R.C. § 106.147 After the enactment of the ACA, 
reevaluating the Section 106 exclusion for employer-provided health 
insurance is now even more appropriate.148 Importantly, this Section 
suggests that the ACA has largely reinforced the traditional arguments 
made in support of repealing Section 106.149 Subsection 1 explains why 
the repeal or reform of I.R.C. § 106 could generate significant federal 
                                                                                                                      
143 See Cong. Budget Office, Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions 
of the Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent Supreme Court Decision 20 
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 Estimates for the ACA]. Despite the broad efforts of the ACA 
to increase coverage, 30 million non-elderly Americans will remain uninsured. See id. at 13. 
This group of people will include: (1) roughly 6 million illegal immigrants; (2) citizens 
who are eligible to enroll in Medicaid, yet choose not to; (3) those not otherwise covered, 
who instead choose to pay the annual penalty—amounting to 2.5% of their income; and 
(4) those whose health care costs would amount to more than 8% of their household in-
come, and who are thus able to opt out of coverage without incurring a penalty. Mark 
Trumbull, Obama Signs Health Care Bill: Who Won’t Be Covered?, Christian Science Moni-
tor (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0323/Obama-signs-health-
care-bill-Who-won-t-be-covered. This also includes a newly added group of uninsureds 
stemming from the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the ACA and the non-required 
expansion of Medicaid, which the CBO estimates will result in an additional 3 million un-
insured Americans. See 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 13. See generally 
Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (striking down the expansion 
of Medicaid under the ACA as an unconstitutional use of congressional spending power). 
144 Sebelius, supra note 117; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (Supp. IV 2010). 
145 Sebelius, supra note 117; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a). The required percentages 
amount to 85% of premium dollars spent pursuant to large employer plans and 80% spent 
pursuant to individual or small employer plans. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b). 
146 Sebelius, supra note 117; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b). 
147 See infra notes 153–236 and accompanying text. 
148 See Joe, supra note 5, at 1322 (explaining that reconsideration of I.R.C. § 106 is now 
possible in light of the ACA); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: A First Look at Romney’s 
Deduction Cap, Tax Notes, Oct. 15, 2012, at 227, 227 (arguing, post-ACA, that reconsider-
ing I.R.C. § 106 is a critical issue). 
149 See infra notes 153–236 and accompanying text. 
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revenues and why the enactment of the ACA has preserved the rele-
vance of this argument.150 Subsection 2 then illustrates that the repeal 
or reform of I.R.C. § 106 would help to reduce the cost of health care 
and that, once again, the passage of the ACA has not diminished the 
credence of this argument.151 Finally, Subsection 3 illustrates that the 
argument that I.R.C. § 106 produces tax inequities still reigns true, and 
that such inequities are made even less tolerable as a result of the 
ACA.152 
1. Repeal of I.R.C. § 106 Will Generate Much-Needed Revenue 
 First and foremost, advocates in favor of repealing Section 106 
highlight that doing so would contribute significantly to federal reve-
nues.153 I.R.C. § 106 is responsible for substantial revenue losses for the 
government because more than 60% of the population under the age 
of sixty-five is covered by employer-provided insurance.154 One Con-
gressional Research Service report suggests that repealing the exclu-
sions for employer-provided insurance would increase federal revenues 
by $700 billion per year.155 Specifically, the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion estimates that excluding employer-provided health insurance from 
the federal income tax will cost the federal government a cumulative 
$725 billion between 2011 and 2015.156 
 The ACA has done little to change the importance of generating 
additional federal revenues.157 There are two competing schools of 
                                                                                                                      
 
150 See infra notes 153–170 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra notes 171–195 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 196–236 and accompanying text. 
153 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 1; Gutman, supra note 42, at 700. 
154 Lyke, supra note 4, at 1. This is because without the exclusion from income that 
I.R.C. § 106 provides, employer-provided health insurance benefits would be taxable in-
come. See Kornhauser, supra note 28, at 313 & n.54; Surrey, supra note 26, at 706. Section 
106, therefore, provides workers with significant tax savings: the average cost for employ-
ment-based individual coverage is roughly $4,750 a year—$12,700 for families. Lyke, supra 
note 4, at 1. 
155 Lyke, supra note 4, at 1; see also Gutman, supra note 42, at 700 (discussing how sig-
nificant spending deductions and increased revenues could occur through repeal of cer-
tain tax expenditures such as the employer-provided exclusion); Sugin, supra note 3, at 12 
(same). But see Joe, supra note 5, at 1322 (hypothesizing that the actual revenues raised 
from repeal of tax expenditures could be much less than commonly projected); Sugin, 
supra note 3, at 11 (same). The precise amount of increased revenues depends on exactly 
which exclusions are repealed. Lyke, supra note 4, at 1. Once again, this Note contem-
plates solely the federal income tax exclusion for employer-provided insurance. 
156 See Joint Comm. on Taxation 2012, supra note 1, at 42. 
157 Compare Cong. Budget Office, Pub. No. 4649, The Budget and Economic Out-
look: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023, at 9 (2013) [hereinafter The Budget and Economic 
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thought regarding the impact that the ACA will have on the federal 
deficit.158 Some argue that the ACA will not decrease the federal deficit 
by a single cent.159 These commentators argue that instead, the ACA will 
add to the nation’s growing deficit.160 In contrast, others argue that the 
ACA will reduce the federal deficit by $84 billion.161 These commenta-
tors point to experimental cost-reduction strategies in the ACA that, 
they argue, will yield further, yet still unquantifiable fiscal benefits.162 
 For the purposes of this Note, either prediction supports the argu-
ment that I.R.C. § 106 should be repealed in order to generate much-
needed federal revenue.163 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
reports that the federal government recently has been recording some 
                                                                                                                      
Outlook: 2013 to 2023] (suggesting that the deficit will grow by nearly $7 trillion be-
tween 2014 and 2023), with The Impact of the Health Care Law on the Economy, Employers, and 
the Workforce: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 112th Cong. 8--12 (2011) 
[hereinafter The Impact of the Health Care Law on the Economy, Employers, and the Workforce] 
(statement of Paul Howard, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Medical Progress at the 
Manhattan Institute) (arguing that the ACA will increase the deficit), and 2012 Estimates 
for the ACA, supra note 143, at 2 (arguing that the ACA will reduce the federal deficit by 
$84 billion), and Chris Conover, Healthcare Law Will Not Reduce the Deficit, Forbes ( Jul. 26, 
2012, 12:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisconover/2012/07/26/healthcare-law-
will-not-reduce-the-deficit-cb/ (arguing that the ACA will not reduce the deficit). 
158 Compare 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 2 (stating that the ACA 
will reduce the federal deficit by $84 billion), Jonathan Cohn, One More Time: CBO Thinks 
Obamacare *Reduces* Deficit, New Republic ( Jul. 24, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/blog/ 
plank/105327/cbo-obamacare-deficit-medicaid-expansion-cost-revenue-exchange# (argu-
ing that the ACA will reduce the federal deficit), and Andrew Taylorricardo Alonso Zaldi-
var, Budget Office: Obama’s Health Law Reduces Deficit, Bloomberg Businessweek (Jul. 24, 
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-07-24/budget-office-obamas-health-law-reduces- 
deficit (same), with The Impact of the Health Care Law on the Economy, Employers, and the Work-
force, supra note 157, at 2–4 (arguing that the ACA will not reduce the deficit, but will actu-
ally increase it), and Conover, supra note 157 (same). 
159 See The Impact of the Health Care Law on the Economy, Employers, and the Workforce, supra 
note 157, at 2–4; Conover, supra note 157. 
160 See The Impact of the Health Care Law on the Economy, Employers, and the Workforce, supra 
note 157, at 2–4; Conover, supra note 157. 
161 See 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 2; Cohn, supra note 158; Zaldi-
var, supra note 158. 
162 See Jonathan Cohn, The GOP’s Trick Play, New Republic ( Jan. 21, 2011), http://www. 
newrepublic.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/81941/trick-play#; Maggie Mahar, How the ACA Saves 
Money & Raises Revenues—Numbers You Can Count On, Health Beat (Nov. 29, 2010), http:// 
www.healthbeatblog.com/2010/11/how-the-aca-saves-money-raises-revenues-numbers-you-
can-count-on/. 
163 Compare The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2013 to 2023, supra note 157, at 9 
(suggesting that the deficit will grow by nearly $7 trillion between 2014 and 2023), with The 
Impact of the Health Care Law on the Economy, Employers, and the Workforce, supra note 157, at 2–
4 (arguing that the ACA will not reduce the deficit), and 2012 Estimates for the ACA, 
supra note 143, at 2 (arguing that the ACA will reduce the federal deficit by $84 billion). 
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of its largest budget deficits since 1947.164 Furthermore, by the end of 
2013, the amount of federal debt held by the public will equal about 
66% of the nation’s gross domestic product.165 Finally, the CBO reports 
that the U.S. budget deficit will grow by nearly $7 trillion between 2014 
and 2023.166 It is evident that more must be done to address the nation’s 
growing deficit, regardless of what impact the ACA has on it.167 That is 
to say, even if the ACA reduces the federal deficit by $84 billion, this fig-
ure is nevertheless insufficient to account for the projected increase in 
the federal deficit in the near future.168 In contrast, the repeal of I.R.C. 
§ 106 would generate significant federal revenues, totaling $700 billion 
per year.169 Although clearly not a panacea for the federal deficit, pro-
repeal arguments that rely on the need for increased federal revenues 
remain relevant today.170 
                                                                                                                      
164 See The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2013 to 2023, supra note 157, at 7–8. 
165 Id. at 7. 
166 Id. at 9. 
167 See id. at 7, 9 (suggesting that the “projected path of the federal budget remains a 
significant concern”). 
168 Compare id. at 9 (suggesting that the deficit will grow by nearly $7 trillion between 
2014 and 2023), with 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 2 (arguing that the 
ACA will reduce the federal deficit by $84 billion). 
169 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 1; Gutman, supra note 42, at 700. For example, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimates that I.R.C. § 106 will cost the federal government $725 
billion in revenues between 2011 and 2015. See Joint Comm. on Taxation 2012, supra 
note 1, at 42. 
170 See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text. Some rebuke this argument be-
cause typical repeal analyses assume that taxpayer behavior remains constant. See Buckley, 
supra note 72, at 259, 261–62 (noting that a taxpayer who is insured through an employer 
may choose to discontinue this coverage after IR.C. § 106 is repealed). Many taxpayers may 
adjust their behavior to avoid paying additional taxes, resulting in a significant disparity 
between original tax expenditure costs and subsequently realized federal revenues. Id. at 
269. For example, one study reports that 23 million insureds would be displaced from 
employer-provided coverage by repeal of the exclusions, 16 million of whom would move 
to the new insurance exchanges created by the ACA. See Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 
697, 702 n.9, 704. This study indicates that this 16 million would be disproportionately 
comprised of low-income earners, who would be enticed by the subsidies provided for in 
the ACA. See id. at 706. Thus, the purported fiscal benefits of repealing the exclusions may 
be illusory; any gains resulting from repeal may be quickly offset by a corresponding in-
crease in government funding for insurance subsidies. Buckley, supra note 72, at 262. Nev-
ertheless, this argument does not bear on the considerations of this Note. Those alarming 
figures were calculated based on a repeal of both the exclusion from the federal income 
tax and the payroll tax exclusion. Buckley, supra note 72, at 261; Gillette et al., supra note 
54, at 704. This Note considers solely the propriety of the income tax exclusion. In con-
trast, the same study reports that repeal of I.R.C. § 106 alone would lead to a much smaller 
displacement of only 3.2% of those formerly insured through their employers moving to 
the ACA exchanges. See Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 704. 
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2. Repeal of I.R.C. § 106 Will Lower the Cost of Health Care 
 A second argument made by pro-repeal advocates is that I.R.C. 
§ 106 is responsible for an “inflationary effect” that causes the un-
checked growth of health care costs.171 Accordingly, the repeal or re-
form of I.R.C. § 106 may help curb the growth of health care outlays.172 
This inflationary effect arises because of a number of critical factors.173 
First, I.R.C. § 106 insulates consumers from the costs of their health 
care expenditures.174 Second, there is no upper limit for the amount of 
excludable income for each employee.175 These combined factors in-
centivize over-insurance: employees purchase comprehensive health 
plans that are both more generous and more expensive than they oth-
erwise would if they bore the cost of these benefits.176 Over-insurance 
leads to the problem of “moral hazard” —insulated employees that en-
joy comprehensive coverage have no incentive to economize their 
spending, and thus tend to over-use that coverage.177 As one scholar 
notes: “An individual with comprehensive health insurance coverage 
might see a specialist, obtain a second opinion, undergo additional 
tests or procedures, or purchase high-priced name-brand pharmaceuti-
cals without incurring any direct financial cost from those choices.”178 
This results in an artificial increase in the total demand for health 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 2, 12; Brown, supra note 37, at 80; Benjamin D. Gehlbach, 
Note, The Preferential Treatment of Employer-Provided Health Care: Time for a Change?, 27 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 398, 412–13 (2011). 
172 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 12; Brown, supra note 37, at 81. 
173 See Gehlbach, supra note 171, at 412–13 (indicating that the combination of cost in-
sulation and an uncapped exclusion exacerbates this inflationary effect). 
174 Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care Tax Policy: A Prognosis: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Fin., 111th Cong. 2 (2006) [hereinafter Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health 
Care] (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Kaplan, supra 
note 88, at 548; Gehlbach, supra note 171, at 412. 
175 Lyke, supra note 4, at 2; Gehlbach, supra note 171, at 413. 
176 See Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 2 (statement of 
Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Lyke, supra note 4, at 12; Kaplan, 
supra note 88, at 546–47. Rational taxpayers engage in over-insurance because the option 
of procuring a tax-free benefit is more beneficial than receiving the identical value in the 
form of taxable, monetary wages. Brown, supra note 37, at 80; Kaplan, supra note 88, at 
546. 
177 Kaplan, supra note 88, at 548; Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 894. 
178 Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 894. The combined factors of insulation from costs 
and limitless excludable income not only result in over-insurance and over-consumption of 
health care goods and services, but also influence preventive behavioral choices. See Kap-
lan, supra note 88, at 548; Wiedenbeck, supra note 37, at 894 & n.37. In this way, costs are 
further exacerbated because these patients are not incentivized to practice preventive 
measures and reduce their health care needs. See Kaplan, supra note 88, at 548; Wieden-
beck, supra note 37, at 894 & n.37. 
2070 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:2047 
care.179 It follows, then, that the exclusion for employer-provided 
health insurance drives up both the cost of health care and the insur-
ance covering it.180 Proponents of this argument therefore suggest that 
exposing consumers to the costs of health care and holding them di-
rectly responsible would instead create an incentive to constrain such 
health care spending.181 This argument thus illustrates that repealing 
I.R.C. § 106 will reduce the overall cost of health care.182 
 Importantly, the ACA does not alter the fact that curbing the rising 
cost of health care remains a compelling federal interest.183 This is pri-
marily because, at this stage, it is difficult to predict how successful the 
ACA will be at reducing health care costs and slowing cost-growth.184 
The ACA installs a variety of pilot programs that include creating the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation,185 encouraging pay-
ment bundling,186 and facilitating preventive care.187 In fact, the ACA 
incorporates virtually every single approach to constraining health care 
                                                                                                                      
179 Lyke, supra note 4, at 12; Brown, supra note 37, at 80; Kaplan, supra note 88, at 548. 
180 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 12; Brown, supra note 37, at 80; Kaplan, supra note 88, at 
547–48. 
181 See Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable, supra note 37, at 4 (tes-
timony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution) (arguing that economists 
broadly support this proposition); Lyke, supra note 4, at 13 (suggesting that this argument 
is supported by theory, experience, and empirical studies). In one study—the RAND 
Health Insurance Experiment—researchers found that outpatient expenses for consumers 
with a 95% coinsurance requirement were 67% lower than the outpatient expenses of a 
comparable cost-insulated group. Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the De-
mand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 251, 258 
(1987). 
182 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 12–13; Brown, supra note 37, at 80–81; Kaplan, supra note 
88, at 548. 
183 Compare Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable, supra note 37, at 1 
(testimony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution) (arguing that over the 
next several decades, federal revenues will be outpaced by continuously increased spend-
ing on programs such as Medicare and Medicaid), and 2012 Long-Term Budget Out-
look, supra note 59, at 1 (predicting that within twenty-five years, annual federal spending 
on health care and Social Security will increase by $850 billion), with Cohn, supra note 162 
(indicating that the degree to which the ACA will be effective at curbing the rising costs of 
health care is unknowable), and Robert Farley, Obama Says Health Reform Legislation Could 
Reduce Costs in Employer Plans by Up to $3,000, PolitiFact (Mar. 19, 2010, 6:07 PM), http:// 
www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/mar/19/barack-obama/obama-says-
health-reform-legislation-could-reduce-/ (same). 
184 See Cohn, supra note 162 (indicating that the degree to which the ACA will be effec-
tive at curbing the rising costs of health care is unknowable); Farley, supra note 183 (same). 
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (Supp. IV 2010). 
186 James & Levine, supra note 123, at 244; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603; 
Skindrud & Cleary, supra note 126, at 52; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (Supp. IV 2010). 
187 Baker, supra note 119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. 
IV 2010). 
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costs that has been suggested by leading experts.188 Nevertheless, al-
though these programs illustrate the federal government’s determina-
tion to rein in the cost of health care, there exists no reliable data re-
garding the efficacy of these programs when implemented together on 
such a large scale.189 As a result, the CBO deliberately did not take into 
account many of these provisions when calculating the ACA’s budget-
ary impact.190 
 In contrast, it is clear that the nation’s health care spending trajec-
tory is unsustainable.191 The CBO predicts that within twenty-five years, 
annual federal spending on health care and Social Security will in-
crease by $850 billion.192 Put another way, federal health care spending 
will soon outpace existing federal revenues.193 Given the uncertainty of 
whether the ACA will control the rising costs of health care, more must 
be done to curb federal health care outlays.194 Thus, the argument that 
repealing I.R.C. § 106 would help reduce the growing cost of health 
care remains a compelling argument today.195 
3. Section 106 of the I.R.C. Violates Norms of Our Tax Policy by 
Creating Both Horizontal and Vertical Inequities 
 A third argument that favors repeal is that Section 106 produces 
both vertical and horizontal inequities.196 Vertical and horizontal equity 
are two desirable norms that policymakers ascribe to the tax code.197 
Horizontal equity is established when similarly situated taxpayers have 
                                                                                                                      
188 Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603. 
189 See Cohn, supra note 162; Farley, supra note 183; Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, New 
Yorker (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/14/091214fa_ 
fact_gawande?currentPage=all. 
190 See Cohn, supra note 162; Farley, supra note 183; Gawande, supra note 189. 
191 See Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable, supra note 37, at 1 (tes-
timony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution) (arguing that over the next 
several decades, federal revenues will be outpaced by continuously increased spending on 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid, resulting in unsustainable increases to the fed-
eral deficit and debt); 2012 Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 59, at 1; Zelinsky, 
supra note 4, at 204. 
192 2012 Long-Term Budget Outlook, supra note 59, at 1. 
193 Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable, supra note 37, at 1 (testimony 
of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution); Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 204. 
194 See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in future health 
care costs and the uncertainty regarding the ACA’s ability to curb these expenses). 
195 See supra notes 183–194 (discussing why the repeal of I.R.C. § 106 would help re-
duce the growing cost of health care). 
196 Singleton, supra note 3, at 332; see Lyke, supra note 4, at 17; Brown, supra note 37, 
at 78–79. 
197 See Brown, supra note 37, at 78; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. 
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similar tax burdens.198 Pro-repeal advocates are critical of I.R.C. § 106 
because, they argue, the exclusion for employer-provided health insur-
ance violates this principle of fairness by engendering horizontal ineq-
uities.199 In practice, the exclusion for employer-provided insurance 
causes similarly situated taxpayers to bear significantly disparate tax 
burdens.200 Consider for example, the discrepancy between “Taxpayer 
A,” who is employed at a firm that does not provide health insurance, 
and “Taxpayer B,” who is employed at a firm that does provide health 
insurance.201 Assuming that the value of their overall compensation 
(wages plus benefits) is identical, Taxpayer A will be subject to a signifi-
cantly higher tax burden than Taxpayer B, who is uniquely capable of 
receiving a tax break.202 This scenario produces unfairness because al-
though the taxpayers were in the same economic position, one tax-
payer was able to reduce his tax burden by taking advantage of I.R.C. 
§ 106, whereas the other could not.203 
 The second principle of fairness implicated by I.R.C. § 106 is “pro-
gressivity,” or vertical equity.204 Policymakers have established a norm 
within the U.S. tax code that higher-income earners should not benefit 
disproportionately from the tax code.205 Instead, high-income indi-
viduals should shoulder a proportionate burden.206 Thus, the U.S. tax 
system employs a gradation of tax rates whereby taxpayers earning pro-
gressively higher wages are subject to higher tax rates.207 This policy of 
imposing greater burdens on those who are more capable of shoulder-
ing them is known as the “ability-to-pay principle.”208 Some scholars 
argue that the exclusion for employer-provided insurance violates this 
principal of tax justice because it is regressive.209 These scholars ob-
serve that taxpayers in higher tax brackets disproportionately benefit 
                                                                                                                      
198 Brown, supra note 37, at 78; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. 
199 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 17–18; Brown, supra note 37, at 78; Singleton, supra note 
3, at 332. 
200 Brown, supra note 37, at 78; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332–33. 
201 See Brown, supra note 37, at 78; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332–33. 
202 See Brown, supra note 37, at 78; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332–33. 
203 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 17–18; Brown, supra note 37, at 78; Singleton, supra note 
3, at 332. 
204 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 18–19; Brown, supra note 37, at 78–79; Singleton, supra 
note 3, at 332. 
205 See Brown, supra note 37, at 78–79; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. 
206 See Brown, supra note 37, at 78–79; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. 
207 Brown, supra note 37, at 78; see Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. 
208 Brown, supra note 37, at 78. 
209 Id. at 78–79; Singleton, supra note 3, at 312. 
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from I.R.C. § 106 when compared to lower-earning taxpayers.210 This 
phenomenon occurs because savings that stem from the exclusion are 
dependent on a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate.211 For example, depend-
ing on their earnings, taxpayers in lower tax brackets might typically 
experience savings that are as low as 10% of their federal income 
taxes—or perhaps none at all.212 In contrast, the comparable savings 
for taxpayers falling in higher tax brackets will be significantly 
greater.213 The result is what some scholars have dubbed the “upside-
down effect,” where despite the fact that two taxpayers may be engag-
ing in the same level of economic activity, the higher-earning taxpayer 
will receive greater subsidies than the lower-earning taxpayer.214 
 In addition, not only do high-income earners disproportionately 
benefit from these exclusions at the individual level, evidence suggests 
that a disproportionate number of high-income earners receive these 
benefits in the first place.215 Thus, by analyzing the distribution of bene-
fits with regard to the typical beneficiary, it becomes apparent that the 
general distribution of benefits results in a further violation of the prin-
ciple of progressivity.216 Scholars have observed that high earners bene-
                                                                                                                      
210 Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 2 (statement of Leo-
nard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Brown, supra note 37, at 79; see Single-
ton, supra note 3, at 332. Pursuant to the exclusion, a high-earning taxpayer who receives 
$13,375 worth of health insurance benefits will save $4681 at a 35% tax rate. Brown, supra 
note 37, at 78–79. In contrast, a taxpayer falling into the lowest tax bracket saves only 
$1337 for the very same health plan. Id. at 79; see also Lyke, supra note 4, at 18–19 (provid-
ing a similar example of the disproportionate dollar savings enjoyed by high earners com-
pared to the often negligible savings enjoyed by lower earners). But see David U. Himmel-
stein & Steffie Woolhandler, The Regressivity of Taxing Employer-Paid Health Insurance, 361 
New Eng. J. Med. e101, e101 (2009), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/ 
NEJMopv0907478 (arguing that the exclusion is progressive by focusing on the percentage 
of income saved, as opposed to dollar values—where the savings of lower-income earners 
amount to a higher percentage of their salaries than the savings of higher earners). 
211 Lyke, supra note 4, at 18. A taxpayer’s “marginal tax rate” is the hypothetical rate of 
tax that would be applied to the very next additional dollar earned by that taxpayer. 
Brown, supra note 37, at 78. Thus, savings resulting from tax expenditures are calculated in 
terms of a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate because the excluded “additional income” would 
have otherwise been taxed at the marginal rate. See id. 
212 Lyke, supra note 4, at 18–19; see Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra 
note 174, at 2 (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Single-
ton, supra note 3, at 332. For example, 36.3% of Americans owed no income tax in 2008. 
Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. 
213 Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 2 (statement of Leo-
nard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Brown, supra 
note 37, at 78–79. 
214 See Sugin, supra note 3, at 8; Surrey, supra note 26, at 723. 
215 Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Brown, supra note 37, at 79. 
216 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Brown, supra note 37, at 79. 
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fit more as a group from I.R.C. § 106 than low earners because they are 
more likely to be provided health insurance pursuant to their employ-
ment.217 For example, only 10% of employees earning less than $10,000 
a year receive employer-provided coverage.218 In contrast, more than 
50% of employees earning $50,000–$75,000 benefit from employer-
provided insurance.219 Furthermore, 61% of employees earning 
$100,000 or more are provided coverage.220 
 Proponents of reform argue that I.R.C. § 106 is irrational and 
wasteful because it gives rise to these virtual inequities.221 These schol-
ars suggest that there is little economic rationale for subsidizing em-
ployer-provided health insurance when the taxpayers that dispropor-
tionately benefit from the subsidy are those in the highest income 
brackets.222 Conversely, those who are most in need of the benefits 
from the exclusion are the least likely to benefit from it.223 Stanley S. 
Surrey suggests that this inequity becomes more apparent if the exclu-
sion for employer-provided insurance is compared to a direct expendi-
ture program.224 I.R.C § 106 is both irrational and inefficient because it 
serves as a direct expenditure that pours vast sums of money into the 
hands of wealthier taxpayers.225 Surrey argues that tax incentives like 
I.R.C. § 106 would have been “laughed out of Congress” had they been 
otherwise structured as direct federal expenditures.226 
 In light of the ACA’s ability to ensure virtually universal health in-
surance coverage for U.S. citizens, the argument that I.R.C. § 106 is 
wasteful and irrational has become all the more compelling.227 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
217 Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Brown, supra note 37, at 79. 
218 Brown, supra note 37, at 79. 
219 Id. 
220 Id.; see also Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 11 (state-
ment of Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute) (indicating that the richest 
0.4% of taxpayers receive subsidies that are twelve times larger than the poorest 30%). 
221 See Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 14 (statement of 
Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Rogers, 
supra note 3, at 898–99. 
222 Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Rogers, supra note 3, at 898–99; see Taking a Checkup on the 
Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 14 (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, 
Urban Institute). 
223 Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 2, 14 (statement of 
Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute). 
224 See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expendi-
tures 136 (1973); Sugin, supra note 3, at 8. 
225 See Surrey, supra note 224, at 136. 
226 See id. 
227 Compare 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 20 (indicating that the 
number of uninsured non-elderly Americans will be reduced by 24 million between 2012 
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justification for I.R.C. § 106 has been that the exclusion expands insur-
ance coverage in the United States.228 To some degree, this has hap-
pened: roughly 60% of those insured are currently covered by an em-
ployer-provided plan.229 And, despite the flaws inherent to I.R.C. § 106, 
the benefit of increasing insurance coverage continued to outweigh the 
perceived drawbacks of the provision.230 Nevertheless, the ACA has es-
sentially usurped the role of employer-provided coverage in expanding 
the prevalence of health insurance.231 One component of the ACA is 
the individual mandate, which will virtually ensure universal health in-
surance coverage.232 Furthermore, the ACA creates a series of ex-
changes through which individuals will be able to purchase a number 
of different insurance packages based on their ability to pay.233 Finally, 
the ACA puts subsidies in place for those who could not otherwise af-
ford insurance.234 As a result, the CBO predicts that the number of un-
insured non-elderly Americans will be reduced by 24 million between 
2012 and 2016.235 Considering the degree to which the ACA will ex-
                                                                                                                      
 
and 2016 as a result of the ACA), Matthew Dalton, Supreme Court Upholds Individual Man-
date, Tax Notes, Jul. 2, 2012, at 17, 17 (indicating that the ACA provides for an individual 
mandate that will incentivize individual coverage), Monahan, supra note 134, at 783 & n.14 
(indicating that the ACA puts subsidies in place for those who could not otherwise afford 
insurance), and Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–71 (indicating that the ACA will create a 
series of exchanges through which individuals will be able to purchase a number of differ-
ent insurance packages based on their affordability), with Lyke, supra note 4, at 17–19 
(illustrating that I.R.C. § 106 is inequitable, irrational, and wasteful), and Staff of Joint 
Comm. on Taxation, 112th Cong., JCX-27-06, Present Law and Analysis Relating to 
the Tax Treatment of Health Savings Accounts and Other Health Expenses 2 
(Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter Joint Comm. on Taxation 2006] (indicating that the 
justification for employer-provided health insurance exclusions rests on the premise that 
they increase the incidence of insurance coverage and reduce the number of uninsured). 
228 Joint Comm. on Taxation 2006, supra note 227, at 2. 
229 See DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 1, at 20. 
230 Roundtable on Financing Healthcare Reform, supra note 97, at 5–6 (statement of Leo-
nard E. Burman, Director, Tax Policy Center); see Lyke, supra note 4, at 18; Joe, supra note 
5, at 1322; see also Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the Tax 
Treatment of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1230 (illustrating 
that increasing the incidence of insurance coverage is an important goal for the federal 
government). 
231 See 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 20; Dalton, supra note 227, at 
17; Monahan, supra note 134, at 783 & n.14; Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–71. 
232 Parmet, supra note 132, at 401; see 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. IV 2010). Nonex-
empt individuals who do not purchase health insurance will be required to pay a penalty 
on their income tax return. Dalton, supra note 227, at 17; see 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)–(c). 
233 Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–71; see 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (Supp. IV 2010). 
234 Monahan, supra note 134, at 783 & n.14; Rosenbaum, supra note 134, at 12; see 26 
U.S.C. § 36B (Supp. IV 2010). 
235 See 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 20. Accordingly, budget ana-
lysts project that between 2012 and 2016, the percentage of insured non-elderly Americans 
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pand insurance coverage, the fact that I.R.C. § 106 disproportionately 
benefits taxpayers who would have otherwise been able to afford insur-
ance and typically fails to aid those for whom the provision was origi-
nally designed, now appears less tolerable than it once was.236 
III. Debunking the Necessity of I.R.C. § 106 and Suggesting a 
Path for Moving Forward 
 Given the degree to which the passage of the ACA has changed the 
U.S. health care landscape,237 the policy considerations in support of 
the federal income tax exclusion for employer-provided health insur-
ance may now be outdated, inapplicable, or irrelevant.238 This Note 
argues that I.R.C. § 106 has been rendered largely superfluous and 
therefore warrants substantial reform.239 Part III begins in Section A by 
illustrating how the ACA renders each of the policy considerations in 
support of preserving I.R.C. § 106 largely moot.240 Section A concludes 
by suggesting that the arguments in favor of repealing I.R.C. § 106 have 
subsequently become increasingly more compelling.241 Finally, Section 
B presents an argument for reform that stops short of calling for out-
right repeal.242 
                                                                                                                      
will climb from 82% to 91%—excluding unauthorized immigrants. See id. But see Gillette et 
al., supra note 54, at 702 n.9, 704 (suggesting that in the context of the ACA, repeal of 
I.R.C. § 106 would result in 3.9 million people becoming uninsured). 
236 Compare 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 20 (indicating that the 
number of uninsured non-elderly Americans will be reduced by 24 million between 2012 
and 2016 as a result of the ACA), with Lyke, supra note 4, at 19 (suggesting that I.R.C. 
§ 106 is inequitable, and that handing out large subsidies to high-income earners is irra-
tional and wasteful), and Joint Comm. on Taxation 2006, supra note 227, at 2 (indicating 
that the purpose of implementing I.R.C. § 106 was that the exclusion would both encour-
age and facilitate the expansion of insurance coverage incidence in the United States). 
237 See Joe, supra note 5, at 1322 (suggesting that the ACA has brought about a dra-
matic change to the U.S. health care system); Stolberg & Pear, supra note 105 (same); su-
pra notes 110–146 and accompanying text (illustrating the effects of the ACA on the U.S. 
health care system). 
238 See Joe, supra note 5, at 1322 (suggesting that passage of the ACA warrants a reex-
amination of I.R.C. § 106); infra notes 250–301 and accompanying text (examining the 
policy considerations in support of I.R.C. § 106 in light of the ACA). 
239 See infra notes 302–310 and accompanying text (suggesting that the ACA has ren-
dered I.R.C. § 106 largely superfluous); infra notes 311–334 (expounding upon how I.R.C. 
§ 106 should be reformed). 
240 See infra notes 243–301 and accompanying text. 
241 See infra notes 302–310 and accompanying text. 
242 See infra notes 311–334 and accompanying text. 
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A. Eroding Support: In Light of the ACA, the Policy Considerations  
in Support of Repealing I.R.C. § 106 Outweigh Those in  
Favor of Preserving It 
 The enactment of the ACA has largely undermined the arguments 
in favor of maintaining I.R.C. § 106.243 In addition, the policy considera-
tions in support of repealing or reforming I.R.C. § 106 have subse-
quently become increasingly compelling.244 Subsection 1 of this Section 
discusses how a number of ACA provisions will soften the potential blow 
that the repeal or reform of Section 106 could potentially impose on 
employers.245 Subsection 2 then asserts that in light of overwhelming 
cost-control measures implemented by the ACA, the argument that 
I.R.C. § 106 remains the only effective means of constraining health care 
costs is no longer accurate.246 Subsection 3 illustrates how, in generating 
effective risk pools and affordable insurance, a variety of ACA provisions 
collectively imitate the advantages of employer-provided health care.247 
Subsection 4 then discusses how the ACA will provide comparable sup-
port to the millions of Americans who currently benefit from I.R.C. 
§ 106.248 Finally, Subsection 5 weighs the policy considerations both for 
and against I.R.C. § 106 in light of the ACA and concludes that the ACA 
has largely usurped the role of I.R.C. § 106, thereby making the policy 
considerations for repeal or reform of I.R.C. § 106 all the more compel-
ling.249 
1. The ACA Also Provides Benefits to Employers 
 In light of the ACA, the benefit that I.R.C. § 106 provides to em-
ployers is now a less compelling policy consideration.250 Although some 
employers may suffer “harm” if they have to raise employee wages,251 
                                                                                                                      
 
243 See infra notes 250–301 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra notes 147–236 and accompanying text (illustrating the policy considera-
tions in support of repeal or reform of I.R.C. § 106); infra notes 250–310 and accompany-
ing text (illustrating how the policy considerations in support of preserving I.R.C. § 106 
have been rendered largely moot by the ACA). 
245 See infra notes 250–255 and accompanying text. 
246 See infra notes 256–274 and accompanying text. 
247 See infra notes 275–289 and accompanying text. 
248 See infra notes 290–301 and accompanying text. 
249 See infra notes 302–310 and accompanying text. 
250 See 42 U.S.C. § 45R(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2010); infra notes 251–255 and accompanying 
text. 
251 See Sugin, supra note 3, at 22 (arguing that I.R.C. § 106 allows employers to pay em-
ployees less wages, and that repeal may harm employers by forcing them to pay higher 
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the ACA offers companies a number of benefits that will mitigate such 
supposed burdens.252 For example, as of 2014, the ACA will provide a 
tax credit to small businesses worth up to 50% of their contribution to 
employee health insurance premiums and a comparable tax credit to 
small non-profits worth up to 35% of their contributions.253 In addi-
tion, one report suggests that over the long term, the cumulative cost-
control measures of the ACA will result in a $3000 per employee reduc-
tion in health care costs for employers.254 Thus, the ACA will help to 
offset potential harms that may arise if employers are forced to increase 
wages due to a repeal or reform of I.R.C. § 106—making this policy 
consideration less compelling than before the enactment of the 
ACA.255 
2. The ACA Implements a Multitude of Cost-Control Measures 
 The ACA includes an extensive series of measures that are designed 
to curb the costs of health care.256 In light of these provisions, the ar-
gument that I.R.C. § 106 remains the only viable means to constrain 
                                                                                                                      
wages); see also supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text (discussing why employers may 
need to raise employee wages in response to repeal of I.R.C. § 106). 
252 See 42 U.S.C. § 45R(a)–(b) (indicating that in 2014, the ACA will provide a tax 
credit to small businesses worth up to 50% of their contribution to their employees’ health 
insurance premiums and a comparable tax credit to small non-profits worth up to 35%); 
Hewitt Assocs., Bus. Roundtable, Health Care Reform: Creating a Sustainable 
Health Care Marketplace 2 (2009), available at http://www. 
pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/11/WealthReportFINAL.pdf (predicting that over the 
long term, the cumulative cost-control measures put in place by the ACA will result in a 
reduction of more than $3000 per employee in health care costs for employers). This ar-
gument relies on the assumption that employees will successfully negotiate higher wages as 
a result of losing the Section 106 tax benefit. See Sugin, supra note 3, at 22. The veracity of 
this argument is beyond the scope of this Note. It is worth noting, however, that it may 
actually be only those in higher-income brackets who will successfully negotiate higher 
wages—by definition mitigating some of the “harm” experienced by employers. See Buck-
ley, supra note 72, at 261; Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 700. 
253 See 42 U.S.C. § 45R(a)–(b). 
254 See Hewitt Assocs., supra note 252, at 2. This report considered the predicted sav-
ings of novel, difficult-to-quantify cost-control measures that will be implemented by the 
ACA. See Farley, supra note 183. The CBO predicts a more modest reduction in cost of 
$100 per employee, though this figure is also subject to criticism, as it fails to account at all 
for these difficult-to-quantify cost-control measures. See id. It is important to note that al-
though both predictions are likely off target, they nevertheless suggest an overall reduc-
tion in employer costs. See id. 
255 See 42 U.S.C. § 45R(a)–(b); Hewitt Assocs., supra note 252, at 2. 
256 See Miller, supra note 7, at 28; see also supra notes 118–130 and accompanying text 
(discussing these cost-control measures). 
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health care costs no longer seems as persuasive.257 The ACA will imple-
ment virtually every single cost-control measure suggested by industry 
experts.258 To do so, the ACA focuses on a number of core reforms.259 
First, the ACA focuses on cutting unnecessary costs.260 These include 
both preventing health care fraud and abuses,261 and promoting pre-
ventive care.262 Second, the ACA seeks to reduce health care costs by 
holding insurance companies more accountable.263 The ACA requires 
insurance companies to spend a certain percentage of premium dollars 
on health care services and quality improvement.264 Insurance compa-
nies must pay a penalty in the form of a rebate to customers if they fail 
to meet these standards.265 Third, the ACA implements a number of 
programs designed to restructure the delivery of health care.266 For ex-
ample, the ACA provides for the creation of Accountable Care Organi-
zations.267 These groups of doctors, acting in concert, will be better 
suited to coordinate patient care and promote preventive services than 
                                                                                                                      
257 Compare Baker, supra note 119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120 (indicating that the 
ACA will constrain costs by promoting preventive measures), James & Levine, supra note 
123, at 242 (indicating the ACA will incentivize cost cutting through the creation of Ac-
countable Care Organizations), Miller, supra note 7, at 28 (indicating that the ACA will 
constrain costs by reforming the health care delivery system and targeting fraud and 
abuse), and Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603 (arguing that the ACA will incentiv-
ize cost cutting through the implementation of a payment bundling pilot program), with 
Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 209–12 (arguing that I.R.C. § 106 should be maintained because 
politicians are unwilling and unable to implement cost-control measures). 
258 Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603. 
259 See Utah Health Policy Project, supra note 122, at 2. 
260 Id.; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 601. 
261 Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 601–02. The CBO predicts that these efforts 
will save $7 billion over ten years. Id. 
262 Baker, supra note 119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 
118, at 602–03; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (Supp. IV 2010). Increasing preventative care has 
been identified as an effective long-term method for reducing health care costs. See James 
F. Fries et al., Reducing Health Care Costs by Reducing the Need and Demand for Medical Services, 
329 New Eng. J. Med. 321, 321 (1993). The ACA promotes preventive care by requiring 
insurance plans to cover the cost of certain preventive services in full. Baker, supra note 
119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13; see also supra note 120 and 
accompanying text (discussing the ACA’s “National Prevention, Health Promotion, and 
Public Health Council”). 
263 Sebelius, supra note 117; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18 (Supp. IV 2010). 
264 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(a). These required percentages amount to 85% of pre-
mium dollars spent pursuant to large employer plans and 80% spent pursuant to individ-
ual or small employer plans. Id. § 300gg-18(b). 
265 See id. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(B). 
266 Miller, supra note 7, at 28. 
267 Gutwald, supra note 123, at 22; James & Levine, supra note 123, at 242; Orszag & 
Emanuel, supra note 118, at 602; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (Supp. IV 2010). 
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individual physicians would be.268 In addition, the ACA provides in-
creased authority for payment bundling.269 Our current “fee-for-service” 
system incentivizes more costly care, as opposed to efficient care.270 Un-
der payment bundling, “episodes of care” are collectively billed at a flat 
rate, which will promote more efficient health care and reduce costs.271 
 The ACA demonstrates a determination for cutting costs that 
commentators argued was previously missing from government pro-
grams.272 Considering the extent of the ACA’s cost-containment provi-
sions, it appears that the federal government has finally shown its will-
ingness to combat the rising cost of health care.273 Thus, in light of the 
ACA, the argument that I.R.C. § 106 will be necessary to control the 
costs of health care is less convincing today.274 
3. The ACA Will Facilitate Risk Pooling as Effectively as I.R.C. § 106 
 The argument that I.R.C. § 106 provides the only effective means 
of risk pooling is no longer accurate.275 First, because of the ACA, the 
                                                                                                                      
 
268 See James & Levine, supra note 123, at 242; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 
602. The ACA encourages doctors to join these organizations by allowing them to keep a 
portion of their net saved costs. Gutwald, supra note 123, at 22; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d). 
269 James & Levine, supra note 123, at 244; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603; 
Skindrud & Cleary, supra note 126, at 52; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (Supp. IV 2010). 
270 Gutwald, supra note 123, at 20–21; supra notes 126–130 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the inefficiencies of the “fee-for-service” system). 
271 James & Levine, supra note 123, at 244–46; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603. 
272 Compare Baker, supra note 119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120 (indicating that the 
ACA will constrain costs by promoting preventive measures), James & Levine, supra note 
123, at 242 (indicating that the ACA will incentivize cost cutting through the creation of 
Accountable Care Organizations), Miller, supra note 7, at 28 (indicating that the ACA will 
constrain costs by reforming the health delivery system and targeting fraud and abuse), 
and Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603 (arguing that the ACA will incentivize cost 
cutting through the implementation of a payment bundling pilot program), with Zelinsky, 
supra note 4, at 211 (arguing that the cost-control measures implemented by employers are 
proof of a determination to curb health care costs that is unmatched by politicians). 
273 See Baker, supra note 119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120; James & Levine, supra note 
123, at 242; Miller, supra note 7, at 28; Orszag & Emanuel, supra note 118, at 603. 
274 Compare Baker, supra note 119, at 1583 & n.25, 1602 & n.120 (indicating that the 
ACA will constrain costs by promoting preventive measures), Miller, supra note 7, at 28 
(indicating that the ACA will constrain costs through a variety of measures), and supra 
notes 118–130 and accompanying text (discussing ACA cost-control measures), with Ze-
linsky, supra note 4, at 209–12, 214 (arguing that I.R.C. § 106 should be maintained be-
cause politicians are unwilling and unable to implement cost-control measures). 
275 Compare Lyke, supra note 4, at 11 (indicating that some of the opposition to repeal 
is rooted in I.R.C. § 106’s ability to generate stable risk pools), with Gillette et al., supra 
note 54, at 703, 705–06 (suggesting that the repeal of I.R.C. § 106 will not cause healthy 
employees to flee employer risk pools), and Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–71 (indicating 
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repeal or reform of I.R.C. § 106 would not destabilize the employer-
provided risk pool.276 One study illustrated that in a pre-ACA world, 
repealing I.R.C. § 106 would most likely cause healthy patrons to leave 
the employer risk pool.277 This was because when faced with the newly 
added tax burden on employer insurance, these patrons would be 
more attracted to the lower premiums of the individual market.278 In 
contrast, with the ACA exchanges as an alternative, healthy employees 
will be less likely to leave employer-provided insurance.279 This is be-
cause the once attractive premiums of the individual market would be 
replaced by community ratings and higher rates in the exchanges.280 
 Second, with the creation of the ACA insurance exchanges in 
2014, employer-provided insurance will no longer be the sole, conven-
ient form of group-based insurance.281 U.S. citizens will now have a vi-
able alternative.282 Like employer-provided insurance, the ACA provi-
sions will avoid the problems of the individual market.283 The ACA will 
include an individual mandate requiring every taxpayer to acquire 
health insurance, or suffer a penalty as a result.284 Thus, there will be 
an incentive for healthy people to join the risk pool, which should sta-
bilize costs.285 
                                                                                                                      
that the 2014 ACA provisions will provide citizens with a viable alternative for insurance in 
the form of new state-based insurance exchanges). 
276 See Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 705. 
277 See id. at 698. 
278 See id. 
279 See id. at 705. 
280 See id. 
281 Compare Gamage, supra note 4, at 676–80 (describing how employer-provided insur-
ance avoids the problems that plague the individual market), with Parmet, supra note 132, 
at 401 (indicating that the individual mandate will combat the issue of adverse selection), 
Roberts, supra note 133, at 1187 (indicating that pursuant to the ACA, insurance compa-
nies will be prohibited both from denying coverage to individuals with preexisting condi-
tions and charging them higher premiums), and Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–71 (indi-
cating that the 2014 ACA provisions will provide citizens with a viable alternative form of 
insurance through new state-based insurance exchanges). 
282 See Parmet, supra note 132, at 401; Roberts, supra note 133, at 1187; Siadak, supra 
note 136, at 869–71. 
283 See Parmet, supra note 132, at 401 (indicating that the individual mandate will com-
bat the issue of adverse selection); Roberts, supra note 133, at 1187 (illustrating that pursu-
ant to the ACA, insurance companies will be both prohibited from denying coverage to 
individuals with preexisting conditions and charging them higher premiums). 
284 Parmet, supra note 132, at 401. 
285 See id. 
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 Furthermore, just as employer-provided insurance was able to 
avoid risk classification, so too does the ACA.286 The ACA implements a 
variety of measures designed specifically to protect unhealthy taxpayers 
from discrimination in the insurance market.287 For example, the ACA 
prevents insurance companies from denying coverage to individuals 
with preexisting conditions, or charging them higher costs.288 As a re-
sult, because the ACA maintains convenient risk pools and protects un-
healthy and at-risk individuals, the arguments in favor of preserving 
I.R.C. § 106 are less compelling.289 
4. The ACA Will Provide Millions of Americans with Benefits 
Comparable to Those They Currently Receive Under I.R.C. § 106 
 The ACA implements a number of provisions that will protect vul-
nerable taxpayers from unaffordable tax increases that might have oth-
erwise stemmed from the repeal of I.R.C. § 106.290 First, some scholars 
note that taxpayers typically have limited choices with regard to their 
insurance plans.291 The ACA may reduce potential tax burdens that 
would result from the repeal of I.R.C. § 106 because the ACA will in-
crease the number of insurance choices available to taxpayers.292 Tax-
payers who would not be able to shoulder the newfound tax burden 
would be able to choose alternative, affordable plans through the ACA 
                                                                                                                      
286 Compare Gamage, supra note 4, at 679–80 (describing how employer-provided insur-
ance avoids the problems of risk classification), with Roberts, supra note 133, at 1187 (observ-
ing that pursuant to the ACA, insurance companies will be both prohibited from denying 
coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions and charging them higher premiums). 
287 Roberts, supra note 133, at 1187; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (Supp. IV 2010) (prohibiting 
insurance companies from denying coverage based on preexisting conditions); id. § 300gg-
3 (Supp. IV 2010) (prohibiting discriminatory rates). 
288 Roberts, supra note 133, at 1187; see 42 U.S.C. § 300gg; id. § 300gg-3. 
289 See supra notes 275–288 (discussing how the ACA creates viable risk pools). 
290 See Monahan, supra note 134, at 783 & n.14 (discussing the subsidies that will be of-
fered for those who could not otherwise afford insurance); Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–
71 (discussing the new insurance exchanges that will be implemented by the ACA and the 
variety of insurance plans). 
291 See Brown, supra note 37, at 81; Anne Underwood, For Many Consumers, Few Insur-
ance Choices, N.Y. Times (Aug. 19, 2009, 9:30 AM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2009/08/19/how-much-competition-among-insurers/. 
292 See Brown, supra note 37, at 81 (arguing that the current lack of competition 
among insurance providers increases costs); Underwood, supra note 291 (illustrating that 
some believe that increased competition from government-run insurance plans would 
help to lower costs); see also Thomas A. Mitchell, State of the Art(s): Protecting Publishers or 
Promoting Progress?, 12 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 31 (2005) (indicating that increased competi-
tion breeds lower prices); Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–71 (describing the new insurance 
exchanges that will be implemented by the ACA and the variety of insurance plans). 
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exchanges.293 Through these exchanges, the ACA will offer an un-
precedented variety of insurance plans with differing rates, thereby al-
lowing taxpayers to choose their coverage based on affordability.294 In 
addition, whereas the consolidation of the insurance industry has been 
a significant factor in driving up premiums in the past,295 the ACA may 
lower overall taxpayer burdens by opening the market to increased 
competition.296 Furthermore, for individuals who cannot even afford 
the most basic coverage through the ACA exchanges, the ACA provides 
subsidies that will enable them to purchase insurance.297 Finally, the 
distribution of I.R.C. § 106 benefits across income levels indicates that 
for the most part, the taxpayers who would suffer from a potentially 
increased tax burden would be those most capable of bearing the addi-
tional costs.298 This is because high-income earners disproportionately 
benefit from I.R.C. § 106.299 In addition, low-income earners who 
would otherwise qualify for the employer-provided insurance benefit 
often do not make enough money to capitalize on that benefit.300 Ac-
cordingly, the support currently given to taxpayers by I.R.C. § 106 will 
                                                                                                                      
293 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 689–90 & n.107. Taxpayers will be able to choose the op-
tion of purchasing insurance in an ACA exchange, and will become eligible for the insurance 
exchange subsidies if the plan that their employer offers them is deemed to be unaffordable. 
Id. This occurs when the amount that a taxpayer is required to contribute to a premium ex-
ceeds 9.8% of the taxpayer’s household income. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)–(C) (Supp. IV 
2010). 
294 See Brown, supra note 37, at 81 (describing the current limited options for employ-
ees); Siadak, supra note 136, at 869–71 (discussing the new insurance exchanges); Under-
wood, supra note 291 (suggesting that many taxpayers currently do not have meaningful 
choices regarding their insurance plans). 
295 See Underwood, supra note 291. 
296 See id. (illustrating that some believe that increased competition from government-
run insurance plans would help to lower costs); see also Brown, supra note 37, at 81 (argu-
ing that the current insurance paradigm suffers from a lack of choice and competition, 
which increases costs and prevents patients from obtaining more affordable alternatives). 
297 Monahan, supra note 134, at 783 & n.14; Rosenbaum, supra note 134, at 12; see 26 
U.S.C. § 36B (Supp. IV 2010). 
298 See Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 2 (statement of 
Leonard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Brown, 
supra note 37, at 79; Singleton, supra note 3, at 332; see also Roundtable on Financing Health-
care Reform, supra note 97, at 5 (statement of Leonard E. Burman, Director, Tax Policy Cen-
ter) (indicating that most low-income earners do not typically benefit from I.R.C. § 106). 
299 Lyke, supra note 4, at 19; Brown, supra note 37, at 79. 
300 Taking a Checkup on the Nation’s Health Care, supra note 174, at 2 (statement of Leo-
nard E. Burman, Senior Fellow, Urban Institute); Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. As of 
2008, 36.3% of Americans did not owe any income tax. Singleton, supra note 3, at 332. 
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still be provided by the ACA, albeit in a more strategic and nuanced 
manner.301 
5. The ACA Has Effectively Usurped the Role of I.R.C. § 106 
 The foregoing analysis reveals that the ACA has largely usurped 
the role of the exclusion for employer-provided insurance and is capa-
ble of replicating many of the benefits that I.R.C. § 106 has provided.302 
The ACA will provide benefits to employers in the form of tax credits, 
and may even reduce the cost of insurance per employee by a signifi-
cant amount.303 In addition, the ACA similarly aims to constrain health 
care costs and is capable of both sustaining current employer risk pools 
and creating additional, independent risk pools.304 Furthermore, the 
ACA will provide similar relief to taxpayers who currently rely on the 
benefit provided by the Section 106 exclusion.305 Finally, whereas the 
primary justification for I.R.C. § 106 was to expand insurance coverage 
in the United States, not only is this the primary goal of the ACA, but 
the ACA actually more effectively accomplishes this goal than the em-
ployer-provided exclusion paradigm ever did.306 
                                                                                                                      
301 See Mitchell, supra note 292, at 31; Monahan, supra note 134, at 783 & n.14; Siadak, 
supra note 136, at 869–71. 
302 See supra notes 243–301 and accompanying text (describing how the ACA renders 
each of the policy considerations in support of I.R.C. § 106 moot). 
303 See 26 U.S.C. § 45R (Supp. IV 2010) (providing for employer tax credits); Hewitt 
Assocs., supra note 252, at 2 (discussing the potential reduced costs for employers); supra 
notes 53–58 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits that the ACA may provide to 
employers generally). 
304 See Miller, supra note 7, at 28 (suggesting that the ACA will help to constrain health 
care costs); supra notes 118–130 and accompanying text (discussing cost-control strategies 
of the ACA at length); supra notes 275–289 and accompanying text (illustrating how the 
ACA will preserve the stability of the employer risk pool as well as generate an additional 
effective risk pool). 
305 See supra notes 290–301 and accompanying text (describing how the ACA will pro-
vide comparable support to the millions of Americans currently benefitting from I.R.C. 
§ 106). 
306 See Joint Comm. on Taxation 2006, supra note 227, at 2 (suggesting that a primary 
justification for the employer-provided insurance exclusion paradigm was to increase the 
number of insureds in the United States); supra notes 131–143 and accompanying text 
(illustrating the methods employed by the ACA to reduce the number of uninsureds in the 
United States). Compare 2012 Estimates for the ACA, supra note 143, at 20 (suggesting 
that between 2012 and 2016, the percentage of insured non-elderly Americans will climb 
from 82% to 91%), with Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 702 n.9, 704 (suggesting that in the 
context of the ACA, the repeal of I.R.C. § 106 would result in 3.9 million people becoming 
uninsured). 
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 As a result, the policy considerations in support of preserving I.R.C. 
§ 106 are largely moot.307 Without meaningful countervailing interests, 
the policy considerations in favor of the repeal or reform of I.R.C. § 106 
have become increasingly compelling.308 Section 106 of the I.R.C. pro-
duces both horizontal and vertical tax inequities which, considering the 
benefits provided by the ACA, are an unjustifiable and irrational waste 
of potential federal revenues.309 Furthermore, the repeal or reform of 
I.R.C. § 106 would reduce the cost of health care by vitiating the insula-
tion effect produced by the exclusion and generating significant federal 
revenues.310 
B. The Best of Both Worlds: Arguing for Reform, Not Repeal 
 This Note argues that I.R.C. § 106 should undergo significant re-
forms, but that policymakers should stop short of outright repeal.311 
There are a number of unavoidable drawbacks that would result from 
the full repeal of I.R.C. § 106.312 First, although the ACA will increase 
insurance coverage, at least one study suggests that repealing I.R.C. 
§ 106 will result in nearly 3.9 million individuals losing coverage en-
tirely.313 Second, whereas the distribution of benefits from this exclu-
sion disproportionately favors the wealthy, many taxpayers who benefit 
from this provision belong to lower-income brackets.314 Outright repeal 
                                                                                                                      
 
307 See supra notes 243–301 and accompanying text (illustrating how the ACA success-
fully addresses each of the policy considerations in support of I.R.C. § 106). 
308 See supra notes 147–236 and accompanying text (discussing the continued persua-
siveness of arguments in favor of repealing I.R.C. § 106 in light of the ACA); supra notes 
243–301 and accompanying text (illustrating how the ACA renders the policy considera-
tions in favor of preserving I.R.C. § 106 largely moot). 
309 See supra notes 196–236 (discussing at length the horizontal and vertical inequities 
of Section 106 both as currently realized and in light of the ACA). 
310 See Lyke, supra note 4, at 12–14 (illustrating how exposing employees to the true 
cost of their health care would help to reduce health care costs); Joint Comm. on Taxa-
tion 2012, supra note 1, at 42 (predicting that I.R.C. § 106 will cost the government $725 
billion between the years 2011–2015); see also supra notes 147–236 and accompanying text 
(illustrating how the ACA does not reduce the relevance of these arguments). 
311 See infra notes 312–334 and accompanying text. 
312 See Brown, supra note 37, at 79 (illustrating that despite the vertical inequity of the 
exclusion, there are some low earners who nevertheless benefit from the exclusion); 
Gamage, supra note 4, at 689–90 & n.107 (indicating that certain taxpayers may fall 
through the cracks with regard to eligibility for the affordability credits of the ACA insur-
ance exchanges); Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 702 n.9, 704 (demonstrating that repeal 
of I.R.C. § 106 will result in nearly 3.9 million citizens losing coverage entirely). 
313 Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 702 n.9, 704. This figure represents the predicted 
reaction to repeal of I.R.C. § 106 in light of the ACA. See id. at 704. 
314 See Brown, supra note 37, at 79. Ten percent of employees earning less than $10,000 
a year currently benefit from the exclusion for employer-provided insurance, and more 
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may be particularly harsh on these low-income individuals.315 This is 
because these citizens will be disqualified from the exchange subsidies 
if they are offered “affordable” coverage from their employers.316 And 
though coverage may be deemed per se “affordable,” in reality, this may 
not be the case.317 For example, if an employer provides individual in-
surance coverage to employees at a rate that does not exceed 9.8% of 
the employee’s annual household income, then the employer-provided 
insurance will be deemed affordable—even if that employee is enrolled 
in a more expensive family plan.318 Importantly, this disqualifies not 
only the employee, but also the employee’s family from the insurance 
exchange credits.319 Accordingly, repealing I.R.C. § 106 would deny 
these taxpayers both the ACA’s credits and the benefit that result from 
excluding employer-provided insurance from their income.320 Never-
theless, the arguments in favor of repeal remain compelling.321 
 One solution that may find the middle ground between both the 
arguments for repeal and the lingering arguments against outright re-
peal would be to convert the exclusion for employer-provided coverage 
into a refundable tax credit.322 Such a tax credit could be designed 
                                                                                                                      
 
than 50% of employees earning $50,000–$75,000 a year currently benefit from the exclu-
sion. Id. 
315 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 689–90 & n.107 (indicating that certain taxpayers who 
may need the benefit of the insurance exchange credits will nevertheless be disqualified 
from recovering them as a result of their employer offering individual coverage at a rate 
that is deemed “affordable”). 
316 See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)–(C) (Supp. IV 2010); Gamage, supra note 4, at 689. 
This is true regardless of whether the employee actually chooses to enroll in the employer-
provided coverage. Gamage, supra note 4, at 689. Nevertheless, employers are incentivized 
to offer these employees “affordable coverage” because they will be penalized for failing to 
do so. Id. at 693 & nn.121 & 126, 694 & n.128; see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c) (Supp. IV 
2010) (codifying this penalty). 
317 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 689. 
318 See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(B)–(C) (illustrating that affordable individual coverage is 
defined as a plan whose payments do not exceed 9.8% of an employee’s annual household 
income); Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(2), (D) ex. 2 (2012) (illustrating that even if 
an employee is enrolled in a more expensive family plan, the measure of “affordability” is 
based on the cost an employee would need to contribute for self-coverage). 
319 Gamage, supra note 4, at 689; see Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(2), (D) ex. 2. 
320 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 689–90 & n.107. 
321 See Making Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security Sustainable, supra note 37, at 4 (tes-
timony of Alice M. Rivlin, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution); Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & 
Susannah Camic, Tax Credits for Health Insurance, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 73, 75 (2009). 
322 See Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 75 (suggesting that I.R.C. § 106 can be re-
formed—instead of repealed—by converting it into a refundable, progressive tax credit); 
Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 Tax Law. 549, 584 (2008) (arguing that the con-
version of the exclusion into a refundable tax credit would be a more equitable and more 
efficient approach than the current arrangement). A tax credit is a benefit that reduces 
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progressively, and mirror the insurance exchange credits, by scaling 
back or entirely eliminating the exclusion for higher-earning taxpay-
ers.323 Importantly, this would still largely accomplish the goals that 
those in favor of repealing the exclusion seek.324 Converting the exclu-
sion into a targeted tax credit would ensure that this tax expenditure 
was disbursed more rationally by targeting taxpayers who actually need 
the benefit and not those who can do without it.325 This would also 
promote both horizontal and vertical principles of tax equity.326 By mir-
roring the exchange subsidies, this solution would ensure that similarly 
situated taxpayers are treated the same.327 In addition, high-income 
taxpayers would no longer disproportionately benefit from the exclu-
sion.328 Converting the exclusion into a targeted tax credit would also 
continue to generate increased federal revenues and help to reduce 
the federal deficit.329 Furthermore, this approach would remove incen-
tives that drive up the cost of health care, thereby promoting a more 
sustainable form of health care spending.330 
 Finally, this solution would also avoid the pitfalls that would accom-
pany the complete repeal of I.R.C. § 106.331 Continuing to provide this 
                                                                                                                      
 
the total amount of taxes owed by a taxpayer, and is therefore static—unaffected by mar-
ginal tax rates. Jenn, supra, at 557. In order for such a credit to preserve this equity, it is 
important that the credit be refundable. See id. This will ensure that a taxpayer whose li-
ability does not exceed the credit will be able to receive the same benefit as a higher-
earning taxpayer whose tax liability exceeds the credit value. See id. 
323 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 715; see also Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 75 
(suggesting that I.R.C. § 106 can be reformed—instead of repealed—by converting it into 
a refundable, progressive tax credit). 
324 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 715 (illustrating how this solution could promote hori-
zontal equity); Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 76–77 (indicating that this solution 
would be a more rational distribution of federal revenues, promote vertical equity, and 
help curb the growing cost of health care); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Em-
ployer Healthcare Exclusion’s Role in Tax Reform, Tax Notes, Oct. 29, 2012, at 462, 465–66 
(indicating that even small reductions to the I.R.C. § 106 benefit would produce signifi-
cant federal revenues). 
325 Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 75–76; Jenn, supra note 322, at 584. 
326 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 715 (indicating that taxpayers under this proposal can 
receive the same benefit regardless of whether they have coverage through their employer 
or through the exchange); Jenn, supra note 322, at 580 (indicating that converting I.R.C. 
§ 106 into a tax credit would promote vertical equity by ensuring that higher-earning tax-
payers no longer disproportionately benefit from this expenditure). 
327 See Gamage, supra note 4, at 715. 
328 Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 76; Jenn, supra note 322, at 580. 
329 Sullivan, supra note 324, at 465–66. 
330 See Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 76–77; Jenn, supra note 322, at 580. 
331 Compare Brown, supra note 37, at 79 (illustrating that despite the vertical inequity of 
the exclusion, there are some low earners who nevertheless benefit from the exclusion), 
and Gamage, supra note 4, at 689–90 & n.107 (indicating that certain taxpayers may fall 
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benefit in the form of a credit would make sure that those who might 
fall through the cracks under repeal and need aid will be able to secure 
it.332 Furthermore, this solution may reduce the number of people who 
are predicted to lose coverage entirely as a result of the full repeal of 
I.R.C. § 106.333 This is because young taxpayers may be less likely to 
forgo coverage if they are offered a refundable tax credit that will miti-
gate the costs of now-taxed employer-provided health benefits.334 
Conclusion 
 Section 106 of the I.R.C., the federal income tax exclusion for em-
ployer-provided health insurance, was enacted decades ago for the pri-
mary purpose of increasing health care coverage in the United States. 
Since then, scholars have advanced a number of policy considerations in 
support of this provision, including the fact that it benefits employers; 
constrains health care costs; generates stable risk pools; and provides 
support for millions of Americans who rely on it. Although this provi-
sion has remained static in the years since its adoption, the American 
health care landscape has recently undergone one of the most expan-
sive legislative overhauls in decades. The Patient Protection and Afford-
                                                                                                                      
through the cracks and be ineligible for ACA credits), with Goldberg & Camic, supra note 
321, at 77 (indicating that this tax credit can be specifically designed to target low- and 
middle-income families). 
332 See Brown, supra note 37, at 79; Gamage, supra note 4, at 689–90 & n.107; Goldberg 
& Camic, supra note 321, at 75. 
333 Compare Gillette et al., supra note 54, at 702 n.9, 704 (indicating that in spite of the 
ACA, the repeal of I.R.C. § 106 would leave nearly 3.9 million individuals formerly covered 
by employer-provided insurance entirely without coverage), and E-mail from Robert Gil-
lette, supra note 104 (indicating that 3.9 million individuals predicted to be left uninsured 
by the ACA would largely consist of young employees who would voluntarily forego cover-
age when faced with either full taxation of employer-provided benefits or community rat-
ings in the exchanges), with Richard Fry et al., Pew Research Ctr., The Old Prosper 
Relative to the Young: The Rising Age Gap in Economic Well-Being 6, 10 (2011), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/11/WealthReportFINAL.pdf (in-
dicating that, as of 2010, 22% of households headed by an adult younger than thirty-five 
live in poverty), Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 75 (indicating that this tax credit 
can be specifically designed to target low- and middle-income families), and Russell 
Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
801, 818 (indicating that, on average, the young are poorer members of society). 
334 Compare Korobkin, supra note 333, at 818 (indicating that, on average, the young 
are the poorest members of society), and E-mail from Robert Gillette, supra note 104 (in-
dicating that young employees may voluntarily forego coverage when faced with either full 
taxation of employer-provided benefits or community ratings in the exchanges), with 
Goldberg & Camic, supra note 321, at 77 (indicating that this tax credit can be specifically 
designed to target low- and middle-income families). 
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able Care Act (ACA) has fundamentally altered the context in which the 
policy considerations in favor of I.R.C. § 106 were couched. 
 This Note has argued that the ACA successfully addresses each of 
the policy concerns that previously justified the preservation of I.R.C. 
§ 106, including the objective of increasing the incidence of insurance 
in the United States. As a result, the policy considerations against I.R.C. 
§ 106 have become increasingly more compelling. With its benefits 
largely rendered moot, I.R.C. § 106 is quickly becoming an antiquated 
piece of legislation that creates disconcerting tax inequities among 
American citizens by favoring the wealthy. Despite this, we should stop 
short of repealing Section 106 entirely, and should, instead, substan-
tially reform it. Converting the exclusion into a progressive, refundable 
tax credit would largely accomplish the goals sought by repeal, while 
still avoiding the negative repercussions that total repeal may engender. 
This reform is critically important because we neither need nor can 
afford to continue supporting two federally funded health care systems. 
Nicholas Drew 
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